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Briffault: The Uncertain Future of the Corporate Contribution Ban

THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF THE
CORPORATE CONTRIBUTION BAN
Richard Briffault*
I. INTRODUCTION
Concern about the role of corporate money in democracy has been a
longstanding theme in American politics. In the late nineteenth century,
the states began to adopt laws restricting the use of corporate funds in
elections.1 The first permanent federal campaign finance law—the
Tillman Act of 1907—targeted corporations by prohibiting federallychartered corporations from making contributions in any election and
prohibiting all corporations from making contributions in federal
elections.2 Subsequently amended, continued, and strengthened by the
Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, and the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002, the federal ban on the contribution of corporate
funds to federal candidates, political parties, and political committees
that contribute to federal candidates is still on the books.3 Twenty-one
states also prohibit corporate contributions to candidates in state
elections.4
Although the Supreme Court sustained the federal corporate
contribution ban as recently as 2003 in FEC v. Beaumont, that decision
and the corporate contribution bans generally today rest on admittedly
“shaky ground.”5 As the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit observed, campaign finance law is “in a state of flux (especially
Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia University School of Law.
This piece is a part of the Valparaiso University Law School’s 2014 Symposium. For more
pieces from the symposium, see Valparaiso University Law School Symposium: Money in
Politics: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. (2015).
1
The Federal Election Campaign Laws:
A Short History, FEC, available at
http://www.fec.gov/info/appfour.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/X4VM-VV5U.
2
Profile: Tillman Act, HISTORY COMMONS, available at http://www.historycommons.
org/entity.jsp?entity=tillman_act_1 (last visited Sept. 21, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/ZH6U-HW7E.
3
Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, 18 U.S.C. § 208 (2012); Taft-Hartley Act of 1947,
29 U.S.C. § 185 (2012); Federal Election Campaign Act, 52 U.S.C. § 30101 (2014); Major
Provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, FEC, http://www.fec.gov/
press/bkgnd/bcra_overview.shtml (last visited Jan. 28, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/6WRR-5PYF.
4
STATE LIMITS ON CONTRIBUTIONS TO CANDIDATES, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES
(Oct. 2013), available at http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/legismgt/Limits_to_
Candidates_2012-2014.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ZCL5-AH2Z.
5
Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 879 n.12 (8th Cir.
2012); FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 164 (2003).
*

397

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 2 [2015], Art. 8

398

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

with regard to campaign-finance laws regulating corporations).”6 Over
the past decade, the Roberts Court has demonstrated little respect for
either legislative campaign finance restrictions or the Court’s own
campaign finance precedents.7 In Citizens United v. FEC, the Court
disavowed one of the justifications Beaumont relied on and called into
question another.8 To be sure, the majority stressed that Citizens United
concerned only a spending ban—not a contribution restriction—and
invoked the Court’s campaign finance doctrine that more stringent
review applies to spending restrictions than to contribution limits.9 But
Citizens United’s emphatic assertion of the First Amendment rights of
corporations surely casts a shadow on the constitutionality of corporate
contribution bans.10 The 2014 decision in McCutcheon v. FEC—which
subtly ratcheted up the Court’s standard of review of contribution
restrictions—darkens that shadow still. Should the Court decide to hear
a constitutional challenge, the fate of the corporate contribution ban is far
from clear.11
Nonetheless, assuming the Court continues to recognize the
constitutional validity of contribution limits and to apply a less strict
Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 189, 199 (2d Cir. 2010).
See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014) (overturning a portion of
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), which sustained federal aggregate contribution limits);
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365–66 (2010) (overturning portions of McConnell v.
FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), and Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990),
which had sustained prohibitions on corporate campaign spending). See, e.g., McCutcheon,
134 S. Ct. at 1462 (invalidating federal aggregate contribution limits); Ariz. Free Enter.
Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2828–29 (2011) (invalidating a
provision of Arizona’s public funding law); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 345–46, 367, 372
(invalidating federal law prohibiting corporate and union independent expenditures and
electioneering communications); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 729, 744 (2008) (invalidating
federal “Millionaire’s Amendment”); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 238, 263 (2006)
(invalidating Vermont contribution limits). See also FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S.
449, 482–83 (2007) (sharply restricting scope of the federal ban on corporate and union
electioneering communications; that ban was subsequently invalidated outright in Citizens
United).
8
Compare Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 348–56 (rejecting “Austin’s antidistortion
rationale”), with Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 153–54 (citing and quoting Austin). Compare Citizens
United, 558 U.S. at 361–62 (rejecting shareholder protection rationale for corporate spending
ban), with Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 155–56 (invoking that rationale).
9
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 345, 356–61.
10
See id. at 342–66 (discussing the First Amendment rights of corporations).
11
The Court has now twice declined opportunities to address the issue. See Iowa Right
to Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker, 134 S. Ct. 1787, 1787 (2014) (denying petition for certiorari to
the Eighth Circuit decision that, inter alia, upheld Iowa law banning campaign
contributions by corporations, insurance companies, savings associations, banks, and credit
unions); Danielczyk v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1459, 1459 (2013) (denying petition for
certiorari to Fourth Circuit decision upholding constitutionality of federal corporate
contribution ban).
6
7
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standard of review to contribution restrictions than to expenditure
limits—admittedly a big “if”—the ban on corporate donations ought to
pass constitutional muster.12 The corporate contribution ban advances
two long-recognized public interests that the Court has repeatedly held
justify contribution restrictions: (1) the protection of the rights of
politically dissenting shareholders; and (2) the prevention of the evasion
of constitutionally valid limits on individual donations to candidates.13
Although Citizens United dismissed the shareholder-protection concern
as a support for an expenditure ban, shareholder-protection is an
important interest previously acknowledged by the Court in the
contribution restriction context, and a contribution ban is closely drawn
to protect that interest.14 Shareholder protection should meet the less
restrictive standard applied to the review of contribution limits.15
So, too, the Court has long accepted prevention of the circumvention
of individual-to-candidate contribution limits as a constitutionally
sufficient justification for other contribution restrictions.16 In Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the Court recognized that a corporation “is
simply a form of organization used by human beings to achieve desired
ends.”17 One of those ends can be making campaign contributions. In
most states, a person can form a corporation simply by filing a few
papers and paying a nominal fee. A single individual can generate
multiple corporations that he or she controls and can use to circumvent
the legal rules governing campaign finance activities. The use of
corporations to evade disclosure requirements has become a regular
occurrence since Citizens United freed corporations to engage in
independent spending.18 If corporations could also make contributions,
then use of the corporate form could easily become a means to avoid the
donation limits on the “people (including shareholders, officers, and
employees) who are [closely] associated with a corporation in one way
or another.”19 Although McCutcheon tightened the “fit” required
between the important public interest a campaign finance law is
intended to sustain and the restrictions imposed by that law, the
corporate contribution ban is narrowly tailored, and leaves room for
other forms of campaign finance activity for the individuals affiliated

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 162.
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 372.
Id. at 362.
Id. at 370–71.
Id. at 364.
134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014).
See generally Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 372 (providing the holding of the Court).
Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
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with the corporation.20 Nor do there appear to be less restrictive
alternatives that can effectively achieve the shareholder-protection and
anti-circumvention goals.
In Citizens United, and again in McCutcheon, the Court emphasized
that the goal of reducing the political power of the wealthy cannot justify
campaign finance restrictions, and it is surely the case that much of the
impetus for the corporate contribution ban is public anxiety over
corporate wealth and power.21 But the shareholder-protection and anticircumvention justifications are not based on an effort to curb the role of
wealth inequalities in politics per se. Rather, they reflect other key
features of the corporate form—its artificial existence as a legal entity to
achieve ends desired by the individuals who have created it, and the
potential for the interests that control the corporation to exploit
dissenting shareholders.22 These two interests work in tandem, with
shareholder-protection having greater purchase for multi-shareholder
publicly-held entities, and anti-circumvention more relevant for singleshareholder, closely-held, or nonprofit corporations. Together, they
make the case for the corporate contribution ban for reasons other than
the equality-promoting goal that Citizens United and McCutcheon so
vehemently rejected.
This Article explores the current constitutional status of the
corporate campaign contribution ban.23 Part II provides a brief history of
corporate campaign finance restrictions, including an analysis of the
Supreme Court’s case law dealing with the campaign finance rules
applicable to corporations before Citizens United. Part III assesses
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1456–57, 1462 (2014).
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 352; McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1448, 1462.
22
Citizens United, 558 U.S. 358–59, 361.
23
This Article does not address laws prohibiting contributions by labor unions, which
have been a part of the federal campaign finance system since 1943 and are on the books in
sixteen states. See NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGS., supra note 4. The two justifications this Article
relies on to sustain the corporate ban—shareholder-protection and anti-circumvention of
the corruption-preventing limits on individual contributions to candidates—do not apply
to unions. As a result of a long string of Supreme Court decisions, dissenting employees
(the equivalent of dissenting shareholders in the union context) required to pay union fees
have a right not to have those fees used for political purposes and to have their required fee
payments reduced accordingly. By enabling them to opt-out of compelled support for
political activity, the Supreme Court has already provided objecting employees protection
from compelled support of political activity. Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and
Political Opt-out Rights After Citizens United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 800, 811–19 (2012). Nor
are unions, unlike corporations as discussed in Part IV, plausible vehicles for evasion of the
limits on individual contributions. See infra Part IV (discussing anti-circumvention).
Individual union dues or fee payments are generally well below the dollar cap on
individual donations, and there seems to be little likelihood—or evidence—that a union
could be created by a wealthy donor solely to end-run the cap on individual donations.
20
21
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Citizens United and its implications for the prohibition on corporate
campaign contributions. Part IV evaluates the shareholder-protection
rationale. Part V examines the anti-corruption argument in light of
McCutcheon’s more restrictive analysis of that justification for campaign
finance regulation. Part VI concludes.
II. THE CORPORATE CONTRIBUTION BAN
A. Origins and Statutory Development
In his Fifth Annual Message to Congress in 1833, President Andrew
Jackson hotly denounced the campaign spending of the Second Bank of
the United States, charging that “this great and powerful institution had
been actively engaged in attempting to influence the elections of the
public officers by means of its money” in 1832.24 In language that would
fit right into today’s campaign finance debates, Jackson declared “the
question is distinctly presented whether the people of the United States
are to govern through representatives chosen by their unbiased suffrages
or whether the money and power of a great corporation are to be secretly
exerted to influence their judgment and control their decisions.”25 Three
decades later, Abraham Lincoln also expressed anxiety about corporate
corruption of the political process.26 With the Civil War generating
enormous profits for government contractors, Lincoln wrote:
I see in the near future a crisis approaching that
unnerves me and causes me to tremble for the safety of
my country. . . . [C]orporations have been enthroned
and an era of corruption in high places will follow, and
the money power of the country will endeavor to
prolong its reign by working upon the prejudices of the
people until all wealth is aggregated in a few hands and
the Republic is destroyed.27

John Woolley & Gerhard Peters, Andrew Jackson, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29475 (last visited Sept. 21, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/7EZ8-67S6.
25
Id.
26
See Rick Crawford, What Lincoln Foresaw: Corporations Being “Enthroned” After the Civil
War and Re-Writing the Laws Defining Their Existence, RATICAL, available at
http://www.ratical.org/corporations/Lincoln.htmlhttp://www.ratical.org/corporations/
Lincoln.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/Q6PF-X9DD
(affirming Lincoln’s apprehensions).
27
Id.
24

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 2 [2015], Art. 8

402

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

Despite these early critical comments, corporations became a central
focus of campaign finance concern only in the late nineteenth century.
Civil service reform cut into the ability of candidates and parties to
finance their campaigns through assessments on government employees,
while the consolidation of major manufacturers, railroads, banks, and
mining and oil companies created large and powerful firms with great
stakes in government tariff, monetary, infrastructure, public lands
development, and regulatory policies.28 In 1886, former President
Rutherford B. Hayes, a Republican, lamented “[t]his is a government of
the people, by the people, and for the people no longer. . . . It is a
government by the corporations, of the corporations, and for the
Two years later President Grover Cleveland, a
corporations.”29
Democrat, pointed to the “existence of trusts, combinations, and
monopolies” and warned Congress in his Fourth Annual Message that
“[c]orporations, which should be the carefully restrained creatures of the
law and the servants of the people, are fast becoming the people’s
masters.”30 As a leading political scientist of the era observed, by 1900,
in the funding of the political parties “[f]irst and foremost come the
representatives of the big industrial or financial concerns.”31
The growing role of corporate campaign money triggered a reaction.
In 1891, Kentucky amended its constitution to become the first state to
ban the use of corporate funds to influence any election in the state.32
That provision is still part of the Kentucky Constitution.33 In 1897,
following the 1896 election, in which the heavily business-funded
Republican Party overwhelmed the Democratic and Populist
presidential candidacy of William Jennings Bryan, three agrarian states
that had supported Bryan—Tennessee, Florida, and Nebraska—banned
Even some
corporate contributions to candidates and parties.34
Republicans from the industrial northeast were troubled by the growing
role of corporate money in politics.35 At New York’s 1894 state
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 258 (2003).
See JACK BEATTY, AGE OF BETRAYAL: THE TRIUMPH OF MONEY IN AMERICA 1865–1900,
xv (Vintage Books 2007).
30
John Woolley & Gerhard Peters, Grover Cleveland, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29529 (last visited Sept. 20, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/F6JQ-B33E.
31
ROBERT E. MUTCH, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS, AND COURTS: THE MAKING OF FEDERAL
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 165 (1988) (quoting M.I. Ostrogorski) [hereinafter MUTCH,
CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS, AND COURTS].
32
Adam Winkler, “Other People’s Money”: Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign
Finance Law, 92 GEO. L.J. 871, 883 (2004).
33
KY. CONST. of 1891, § 150.
34
Perry Belmont, Publicity of Election Expenditures, 180 NO. AM. REV. 166, 175 (1905).
35
Id. at 183.
28
29
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constitutional convention, corporate lawyer Elihu Root, subsequently
William McKinley’s and Theodore Roosevelt’s secretary of war and
Roosevelt’s secretary of state, led an unsuccessful effort to insert a
corporate contribution ban into the state constitution.36 In 1901, William
E. Chandler, a Republican senator from New Hampshire and a former
Republican National Committee chairman, introduced the first federal
bill to keep corporations out of congressional election campaigns.37
Public attention to corporate campaign money mounted during the
1904 presidential election. More than a million dollars—or about $25
million in 2014 dollars—quietly flowed into Theodore Roosevelt’s
campaign from J.P. Morgan, Henry Clay Frick, and senior executives at
Standard Oil, the New York Central Railroad, and major insurance
companies.38 Following up on earlier, and at that time inaccurate,
allegations by Joseph Pulitzer in the New York World that the major trusts
were making large contributions to Roosevelt to head off investigations
by the recently-created federal Bureau of Corporations, Democratic
candidate Alton Parker made a major campaign address in which he
claimed that “debasing and corrupt” payments had been made to the
GOP by “individuals of corporations . . . who would control the results
of election contests.”39 His integrity as a trust-buster challenged,
Roosevelt responded by denying that any business contributions he had
received involved corrupt dealings and pointed to the “great corporate
interests” that were financing his opponent.40
The following year, the New York Legislative Investigating
Committee (“Armstrong Committee”) revealed in public hearings that
New York’s three major life insurance companies—the Equitable, New
York Life, and Mutual Life—had contributed hundreds of thousands of
dollars to the national Republican Party and Republican officeholders in
the 1896, 1900, and 1904 elections.41 This “caused a profound sensation
as it furnished the first tangible evidence of connections between the
insurance company and a political party,” and was seen as confirming
the allegations Parker had hurled at Roosevelt the year before.42 In

Id. at 168–69.
Melvin I. Urofsky, Campaign Finance Reform Before 1971, 1 ALB. L. REV. 2, 16 (2008).
38
EDMUND MORRIS, THEODORE REX 356–60 (2001).
39
Id. at 361.
40
Id. at 363.
41
MUTCH, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS, AND COURTS, supra note 31, at 2.
42
Id. (quoting the Sept. 16, 1905 New York Herald Tribune). As Mutch explains, the big
insurance companies loomed much larger in the national economy in 1905 than they do
today. In 1903, the three insurers “together took in more money than the entire internal
revenue receipts of the federal government.” Robert E. Mutch, Before and After Bellotti: The
Corporate Political Contributions Cases, 5 ELEC. L.J. 293, 295 n.5 (2006).
36
37
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response, Roosevelt in his 1905 Annual Message to Congress pointed to
the “corruption of the flagrant kind which has been exposed,” and urged
that “[a]ll contributions by corporations to any political committee or for
any political purpose should be forbidden by law.”43 Senator Benjamin
R. “Pitchfork Ben” Tillman, a South Carolina Democrat, introduced a bill
to implement Roosevelt’s proposal as part of a broader, partisan effort to
investigate corporate contributions in the three prior national elections.44
The Republican-led Senate quickly passed the bill without debate,
avoiding the potentially embarrassing investigation Tillman had sought,
but the measure died in the House.45 Roosevelt repeated his call for a
corporate contribution ban in his 1906 Annual Message; it was the very
first item on his agenda.46 When the House reconvened for its short
lame-duck session in January 1907, it quickly passed Tillman’s bill,
which prohibited federally-chartered corporations from making
contributions in any election, and prohibited all corporations from
making contributions in federal elections.47
Campaign finance law’s early and intensive focus on corporations
reflected two concerns. First, there was a sharp and growing anxiety
about corporate influence over government. As Elihu Root argued to the
1894 New York Constitutional Convention, “great moneyed
interests . . . are exerting yearly more and more undue influence in
political affairs.” A corporate contribution ban would:
[P]revent the great moneyed corporations of the country
from furnishing the money with which to elect members
of the legislature of this state, in order that those
members . . . may vote to protect the corporations. It is
to prevent the great railroad companies, the great
insurance companies, the great telephone companies, the
great aggregations of wealth from using corporate
funds, directly or indirectly, to send members of the
legislature to these halls, in order to vote for their

John Woolley & Gerhard Peters, Theodore Roosevelt: Fifth Annual Message, December 5,
1905, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
?pid=29546 (last visited Sept. 20, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/V8NN-SXCQ.
44
ROBERT E. MUTCH, BUYING THE VOTE: A HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 48–
50 (2014) [hereinafter MUTCH, BUYING THE VOTE].
45
See MUTCH, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS, AND COURTS, supra note 31, at 5–7.
46
See John Woolley & Gerhard Peters, Theodore Roosevelt: Sixth Annual Message,
December 3, 1906, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
ws/?pid=29547 (last visited Sept. 20, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/8VJ8-BAHQ
[hereinafter Sixth Annual Message] (calling for a ban of corporate campaign contributions).
47
MUTCH, BUYING THE VOTE, supra note 44, at 50.
43
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protection and the advancement of their interest as
against those of the public.48
As Root explained, corporate campaign contributions put the political
parties in their debt, “a debt to be recognized and repaid with the votes
of representatives in the legislature and in Congress or by the action of
administrative and executive officers who have been elected in a [large]
measure through the use of the money so contributed.”49 In its report to
the New York state legislature, the Armstrong Committee made the
same point:
The testimony taken by the Committee makes it
abundantly clear that the large insurance companies
systematically attempted to control legislation in this
and
other
states. . . . It
is
apparent
that
contributions . . . for use in State Campaigns were made
with the idea that they would be protected in matters of
legislation. Senator Platt, to whom the contributions
were made, testified that it was supposed that an
advantage would be derived through his relation to the
[Republican] State Committee . . . ; in short, that the use
of the contributed moneys in the election of candidates
to office would place them under more or less of an
implied obligation not to attack the interests supporting
them.50
Controlling corporate campaign contributions was part of a broader
program of addressing corporate power. Theodore Roosevelt combined
his call for a ban on corporate campaign contributions with other
proposals for the “adequate regulation and supervision of the great
corporations.”51
Second, there was evidence that corporate executives were misusing
shareholder funds to advance their own interests—what has come to be
known as the “other people’s money” problem. The Armstrong
Committee found that insurance company contributions were often
ELIHU ROOT, THE POLITICAL USES OF MONEY, in E. Root, ADDRESSES ON GOVERNMENT
CITIZENSHIP 143 (collected and edited by Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott, 1916,
reprinted 1969).
49
Id. at 144.
50
JOHN F. O’BRIEN, TESTIMONY TAKEN BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE AND
ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK TO INVESTIGATE AND EXAMINE INTO THE BUSINESS
AND AFFAIRS OF LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES DOING BUSINESS IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK
2916 (1905).
51
Sixth Annual Message, supra note 46.
48

AND
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inconsistent with the partisan preferences of policyholders, as “executive
officers have sought to impose their political views upon a constituency
of divergent convictions.”52 Sometimes the contributions were actually
used to advance goals adverse to shareholder interests. The Committee
noted that the big insurance companies were making large contributions
at a time when the legislature was considering legislation that would
affect the ability of policyholders to sue insurance companies for breach
for fiduciary duty.53 In other words, the leaders of these companies were
using policyholder funds to secure legislative protection for themselves
against their own policyholders.54
Following the Teapot Dome scandal of the early 1920s, the Tillman
Act was strengthened by the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925,
which broadened the contribution ban from money donations to include
“anything of value,” thereby picking up corporate loans, in-kind
assistance, and the use of corporate facilities.55 In the 1940s, a similar ban
was imposed on labor union contributions in federal elections, and in the
Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 the contribution ban was expanded to include a
prohibition on campaign expenditures by both corporations and
unions.56 Unions responded to the restrictions on their campaign
activities with the innovation of the political action committee (“PAC”), a
formally separate, albeit affiliated, entity with its own officers and funds
provided by nominally voluntary contributions by union members.57
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”) was primarily
focused on contributions by individuals and on the campaign practices
of candidates, parties, and political committees, but it also clarified the
legality of the PAC device and authorized certain corporate and union
campaign finance activities.58 The 1971 Act, along with amendments in
1974 and 1976, confirmed that a corporation or union could set up a
“separate, segregated fund”—that is, a PAC—which could solicit
donations, subject to monetary limits, from individuals affiliated with
the corporation or union and use those funds to contribute to, or spend
Earl R. Sikes, STATE AND FEDERAL CORRUPT-PRACTICES LEGISLATION 109–10 (Duke
Univ. Press 1928).
53
Id.
54
Winkler, supra note 32, at 895–96.
55
52 U.S.C § 30101(8)(A)(i) (2014).
56
29 U.S.C. §§ 401–531 (2012).
57
The Federal Election Campaign Laws: A Short History, supra note 1.
58
Before FECA, President Kennedy’s President’s Commission on Campaign Costs
recommended many changes to federal campaign finance law, including the abolition of
the ceilings on individual contributions and on total expenditures by political committees,
but the Commission also called for the retention and strict enforcement of the prohibitions
on corporate and union contributions and expenditures. FINANCING PRESIDENTIAL
CAMPAIGNS, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON CAMPAIGN COSTS (1962).
52
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money supporting or opposing, federal candidates.59 The Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA” or “McCain-Feingold”)
subsequently extended the reach of the Taft-Hartley Act’s corporate and
union expenditure ban and expanded the corporate and union
contribution prohibition to include all donations to the national political
parties and all donations to state parties used to finance a defined set of
federal election activities.60
B. The Corporate Campaign Finance Restrictions in the Courts
1.

The Early Years

Early twentieth century courts had little difficulty upholding the
special restrictions on corporations. The courts treated corporations as
artificial creatures with powers limited to the business purposes spelled
out in their charters, and viewed corporate money as presenting a
particular danger of “corrupting the elector and debauching the
election.”61 Before the 1940s, the First Amendment played little role in
the judicial assessment of campaign finance restrictions. Even when free
speech concerns were considered, limits on corporate money were not a
problem because, in the words of one state supreme court, “[t]he
individual activities of the officers of corporations are not prohibited.

59
The parent organization could use its own funds—known as “treasury funds”—to
pay the costs of administering the PAC and of raising funds for it, select the PAC’s
personnel, and set the PAC’s contribution and expenditure activity. FECA exempted from
restriction the expenditure of corporate or union treasury funds on internal
communications, which are “communications by a corporation to its stockholders and
executive or administrative personnel and their families or by a labor organization to its
members and their families on any subject.” 52 U.S.C. § 30118(b)(2)(A) (2014). This
essentially codified the decision in United States v. CIO. See 335 U.S. 106, 123–24 (1948)
(holding that Congress did not intend to prohibit electoral expenditures by a union that
consisted of communications by the union to its members). The law further provided that
“nonpartisan registration and get-out-the-vote campaigns by a corporation aimed at its
stockholders and executive and administrative personnel and their families, or by a labor
organization aimed at its members and their families,” would not be treated as forbidden
contributions or expenditures. 52 U.S.C. § 30118(b)(2)(B) (2014).
60
Major Provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, supra note 3.
61
United States v. U.S. Brewers’ Ass’n, 239 F. 163, 169 (W.D. Pa. 1916); see, e.g., People v.
Gansley, 158 N.W. 195, 200 (Mich. 1916) (noting the state may exercise its “police power”
over corporations with “great freedom for the general good”); People ex rel. Perkins v.
Moss, 187 N.Y. Crim. R. 383, 387 (1907) (“There are a great many things which those
intrusted with the management of corporate properties are known to do and which they
ought not to do, whatever their good motives, not because some statute forbids, but
because they are not within the scope of the chartered powers.”); McConnell v.
Combination Mining & Milling, 76 P. 194, 199 (Mont. 1904) (noting campaign contributions
were “clearly outside of the purposes for which the corporation was created”).
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They may freely speak, write, and publish their views.”62 The few
constitutional challenges to restrictions on corporate campaign activity
were rejected.63 A federal district court upheld the Tillman Act barring
corporate campaign contributions in federal elections in 1916 as a
measure preventing “undue influence” and “preserving the freedom of
the voter and the purity of the ballot.”64
The Supreme Court did not directly address the restrictions on
corporate campaign activity before Buckley v. Valeo ushered in the
modern era of campaign finance jurisprudence, but in one important
pre-Buckley decision dealing with the Taft-Hartley Act’s prohibition of
union campaign expenditures, the Court demonstrated considerable
sympathy for the view that corporate financial power poses a threat to
democratic elections.65 In United States v. Auto Workers, the Court
considered a challenge to the indictment of a union for spending
treasury funds on television ads endorsing candidates in a congressional
election.66 The district court had held that the union’s spending fell
within an exemption to the Act’s spending ban; the Supreme Court
reversed, holding the ads fell squarely within the statute.67 That left the
question of whether the Act was constitutional. Without resolving that
question, Justice Frankfurter’s opinion for the Court provided a lengthy,
sympathetic, and detailed account—dating back to the post-Civil War
era and quoting from Elihu Root’s address to the 1894 New York
Constitutional Convention—of public concern about the concentration of
wealth, the “felt threat to economic freedom created by enormous
industrial combines,” and the decades-long efforts by state and federal
governments to control first corporate and then union money in electoral
politics.68 In his words, these measures were intended to protect “the
integrity of our electoral process, and, not less, the responsibility of the
individual citizen for the successful functioning of that process.”69 The
Taft-Hartley restrictions were the culmination of a “long series of
congressional efforts calculated to avoid the deleterious influences on
Gansley, 158 N.W. at 201.
See id. (rejecting the challenges).
64
U.S. Brewers’ Ass’n, 239 F. at 168.
65
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
66
United States v. Int’l Union United Auto., Aircraft and Agric. Implement Workers of
Am., 352 U.S. 567, 568, 584 (1957).
67
In an earlier decision, the Supreme Court had held that the spending prohibition did
not apply to communications by a union to its own members and their families. United
States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 123–24 (1948). The district court had held that the Auto
Workers spending fell within the CIO exemption. Id. at 108–09.
68
See Auto Workers, 352 U.S. at 570–84 (providing an historical account of the regulation
of corporate campaign finance activity); id. at 570–71.
69
Id. at 570.
62
63
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federal elections resulting from the use of money by those who exercise
control over large aggregations of capital.”70 The law was intended “to
protect the political process from what it [Congress] deemed to be the
corroding effect of money employed in elections by aggregated
power.”71
2.

First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti

In 1976, Buckley v. Valeo laid the foundation of modern campaign
finance jurisprudence by finding that campaign finance restrictions
implicate the freedoms of speech and association protected by the First
Amendment.72 The Court applied strict judicial scrutiny to expenditure
limits, but found that contribution restrictions may be sustained “if the
State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means
closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational
freedoms.”73 It then held that “the prevention of corruption and the
appearance of corruption spawned by the real or imagined coercive
influence of large financial contributions on candidates’ positions and on
their actions if elected to office” are a sufficiently important interest to
justify contribution limitations.74 Buckley did not address the special
restrictions on corporate contributions and expenditures, but two years
later, in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, the Court decided its first
Bellotti held that the First
corporate campaign finance case.75
Amendment applies to restrictions on corporate campaign activity, and
Id. at 585.
Id. at 582. Despite the glowing words, the Court determined that it was premature to
resolve the constitutional question as the case had not actually been tried. Id. at 589–92. On
remand, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty, and the case did not return to the
Supreme Court. Three justices, in an opinion by Justice Douglas, would have invalidated
the statute under the First Amendment. Auto Workers, 352 U.S. at 593–98.
One pre-Buckley court of appeals case directly addressed and sustained the federal
prohibition of corporate campaign spending. See United States v. Lewis Food Co., 366 F.2d
710, 713–14 (9th Cir. 1966) (“[T]he necessity for destroying the influence over elections
which corporations exercised through financial contributions.”). Only one pre-Buckley
Supreme Court case dealt directly with corporate campaign activity. In Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66, 82 (1975), the Court held that Taft-Hartley did not endow shareholders with a
private right of action to sue their corporation for illegal corporate campaign finance
activities. Cort turned on the standards for implying private rights of action and the
significance of Congress’s creation of the FEC to enforce federal election law rather than the
constitutionality of the restrictions on corporations. Id. at 85.
72
See 424 U.S. 1, 14–18 (1976) (stating that campaign finance regulations are subject to
review under the First Amendment).
73
Id. at 25.
74
Id. at 25, 29.
75
See 435 U.S. 765, 767 (1978) (reviewing campaign expenditures by banks and
corporations).
70
71
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it invalidated a provision of the Massachusetts constitution barring a
corporation from spending concerning a ballot measure that did not
materially affect its business, property, or assets.76
Writing for the majority, Justice Powell determined that even though
a corporation lacks a natural person’s “interest in self-expression,” its
electioneering is valuable because of the central role election-related
speech plays in informing “democratic decision-making.”77 Moreover,
the “inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing
the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether
corporation, association, union, or individual.”78 Corporate campaign
speech is constitutionally protected not because of the corporation’s
interest in being able to speak to advance its self-interest—which was
taken care of by the exception from the state’s spending ban for ballot
propositions affecting corporate business, property, or assets—but
because of the societal interest in voters being able to hear information
and ideas relevant to the election. Following Buckley’s determination
that strict judicial scrutiny must be applied to expenditure restrictions,
the Court considered the two justifications the state asserted to justify its
restriction: (1) “sustain[ing] the active, alert responsibility of the
individual citizen in a democracy,” thereby preventing diminution of the
citizen’s confidence in government; and (2) protecting the rights of
dissenting shareholders.79
The Court agreed that the first justification was an interest “of the
highest importance.”80 The state’s argument that campaign spending by
“wealthy and powerful corporations” can “drown out other points of
view” and thereby undermine active citizen participation and public
confidence in government would be deemed worthy of consideration,
but only if there were “record or legislative findings that corporate
advocacy imminently threatened to undermine democratic processes.”81
The Court found there had been “no showing that the relative voice of
corporations has been overwhelming or even significant in influencing
referenda in Massachusetts” or posed any threat to public confidence in
government.82 More significantly, the majority expressed some doubt
that such a negative effect of corporate campaign spending could ever be
shown.83 The Court then reframed the state’s argument into Buckley’s
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
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Id. at 802.
Id. at 777 n.12.
Id. at 776–77.
Id. at 788.
Id. at 789.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789.
Id. at 789–90.
Id.
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concern with the quid pro quo corruption of campaign money on
officeholders. It concluded that such a quid pro quo could not arise in a
ballot proposition election because the spending did not concern a
candidate who could be “corrupted.”84
The state’s interest in protecting the interests of dissenting
shareholders received relatively short shrift. Shareholder protection was
deemed to be “an interest that is both legitimate and traditionally within
the province of state law,” but banning corporate spending in elections
was held to be both over inclusive and under inclusive.85 It was over
inclusive because it would apply even if the spending received
unanimous shareholder approval, and it was under inclusive because it
targeted corporate campaign spending but not corporate lobbying, and
only corporations and no other organizations, such as business trusts or
unions.86
3.

NRWC, MCFL, and Austin

The four dissenters in Bellotti concluded that the case cast
“considerable” doubt on all federal and state restrictions on corporate
campaign finance activity.87 Yet, those restrictions proved surprisingly
resilient. Just four years after Bellotti, a unanimous Supreme Court, in an
opinion by Justice Rehnquist, upheld the FECA provision restricting the
ability of a corporation to solicit contributions for its federal election
PAC.88 The case involved the National Right to Work Committee
(“NWRC”) a nonstock, nonprofit, ideological, anti-union corporation.89
FECA provides that a corporation may solicit contributions for its PAC
only from executive and administrative personnel and shareholders; a
nonstock corporation that has no shareholders may solicit its “members”
but not the general public.90 NRWC did not have formal members but
claimed that individuals affiliated with the organization by contributing
to it, so that a contributor became a member for the purpose of future
solicitations.91 In FEC v. NRWC, the Supreme Court rejected NRWC’s
statutory interpretation of “member”—thereby constraining the ability of
the organization to raise campaign funds—and then upheld the

84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91

Id. at 789–92.
Id. at 792.
Id. at 792–95.
Belloti, 435 U.S. at 802–03 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 812 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
FEC v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 207–09 (1982).
Id. at 198.
Id. at 202.
Id.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 2 [2015], Art. 8

412

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

constitutionality of the solicitation restriction.92 The Court found that
two government interests justified the corporate restriction: (1) ensuring
that “substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the special
advantages of the corporate form . . . should not be converted into
political ‘war chests’ which could be used to incur political debts from
legislators who are aided by contributions”; and (2) protecting the
“individuals who have paid money into a corporation or union for
purposes other than the support of candidates from having their money
used to support political candidates to whom they may be opposed.”93
Strikingly, the Court applied the general arguments for special
restrictions on corporations to an entity totally unlike the paradigmatic
powerful business corporation that had long been the inspiration for the
special restrictions on corporations.94 The NRWC PAC had collected just
$77,000 in the first year it claimed that its donors should be treated as
members, which was hardly a “substantial aggregation of wealth.”95 As
a non-stock ideological organization, its putative members were
voluntary donors who presumably had contributed to the PAC because
they generally supported the organization’s political views, not for
unrelated investment purposes. But instead of closely examining the
applicability of the general restrictions on corporations to the
organization at hand, the Court expressed its willingness to honor the
“legislative judgment” that it was the “special characteristics of the
corporate structure” not the wealth resulting from the corporate form or
the use of the corporation as an investment device that “require
particularly careful regulation.”96 Tracing the development of the
corporate and union restrictions from the Tillman Act and the Federal
Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, through Taft-Hartley, FECA and its
amendments, the Court concluded that this history of “careful legislative
adjustment of the federal electoral laws . . . to account for the particular
legal and economic attributes of corporations and labor organizations
warrants considerable deference.”97 The Court declined to “secondguess a legislative judgment as to the need for prophylactic measures
where corruption is the evil feared.”98
Bellotti and NRWC were technically reconcilable—the latter involved
contributions and candidate elections while the former dealt with
See id. at 206 (analyzing “member”); see also id. at 208 (finding the statutory
prohibitions and exceptions are sufficiently tailored).
93
NRWC, 459 U.S. at 208.
94
Id. at 206.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 209–10.
97
Id. at 209.
98
Id. at 210.
92
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expenditures and a ballot proposition election—but the tenor and
reasoning were totally different, with NRWC drawing on the pre-Buckley
era’s focus on corporate wealth and the misuse of “other people’s
money.” Four years later, in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.
(“MCFL”), the Court avoided choosing between the two approaches.99
MCFL, a nonprofit, nonstock corporation organized to engage in
educational and political activities in support of the “right-to-life” cause,
used its treasury funds to send voters literature presenting the voting
records of federal and state candidates from a “pro-life” perspective.100
The FEC contended these campaign expenditures should have been
funded by MCFL’s PAC, not the corporation’s treasury funds.101 The
Supreme Court held that the First Amendment required the exclusion of
campaign spending by ideological non-profit corporations like MCFL
from the general corporate spending ban, but did so in an opinion
implying that the application of the ban to business corporations would
be valid.102
Justice Brennan’s opinion for the Court found that corporate
campaign spending poses the danger of “the corrosive influence of
concentrated corporate wealth” on the “integrity of the marketplace of
political ideas.”103 Justice Brennan emphasized that corporate resources
are:

99
479 U.S. 238, 245 (1986). The Court also addressed the federal ban on corporate
spending in FEC v. Nat’l Conservative PAC (NCPAC), 470 U.S. 480, 496 (1985), but the
corporate status of NCPAC was essentially peripheral to the case. NCPAC dealt with a
constitutional challenge to the federal law capping independent spending to aid a
presidential candidate who had accepted public funding. Defenders of the law pointed out
that both NCPAC and another independent spending committee in the case were
corporations, and argued that NRWC’s justifications for limits on solicitation by corporate
PACs would also support limits on independent spending by these corporations. Id.
However, the NCPAC majority noted that the statute limiting independent spending in
elections with publicly-funded candidates did not target only corporations but restricted
spending by any committee, association, or organization whether or not incorporated. Id.
Accordingly, the Court did not treat NCPAC as a corporation case. The Court noted that,
as in Buckley, it did not reach “the question whether corporations can constitutionally be
restricted in making independent expenditures to influence elections for public office.” Id.
100
MCFL, 479 U.S. at 241.
101
Id. at 238.
102
Id. MCFL had also raised a statutory argument that its spending fell within FECA’s
exemption from the corporate expenditure ban for “any news story, commentary, or
editorial distributed through the facilities of any . . . newspaper, magazine, or other
periodical” other than one controlled by a candidate or political party. Id. at 250 (citing 2
U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(i) (currently codified at 52 U.S.C. § 30101(9)(B)(i) (2014))); see also MCFL,
479 U.S. at 250–51 (rejecting that argument); id. at 249–50 (rejecting MCFL’s constitutional
claim that its spending did not contain express advocacy).
103
Id. at 257.
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[N]ot an indication of popular support for the
corporation’s political ideas [but instead reflect] nothing
more than the ‘economically motivated decisions of
investors and customers. . . . The availability of these
resources may make a corporation a formidable political
presence, even though the power of the corporation may
be no reflection of the power of its ideas.’”104
But MCFL’s spending did not raise these concerns. The organization
was formed for a political purpose, not an economic one; it did not
engage in business activities or amass capital in the economic
marketplace; and the donations it received necessarily reflected the
donors’ support for its political views.105 It did not accept contributions
from business corporations, so it could not serve as a conduit for
Moreover, donors had no
proscribed corporate expenditures.106
economic stake in the organization which might discourage them from
disassociating from it if they disagreed with its electioneering.107
Although corporate in form, MCFL was really a political association and
not the kind of business that comes to mind when the term
“corporation” is used.108 As a result, the First Amendment required that
MCFL and comparable ideological entities be exempted from the
spending ban.109 But the theory of the MCFL exemption supported
application of the ban to business corporations that fit the spirit of the
restriction.110 Four justices, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
dissented, finding the ban should even have been applied to MCFL.111
They contended that, as in NRWC, the Court should defer to Congress’s
judgment that spending enabled by the corporate form inherently
threatens the political process.112 The dissenters also stressed that given
the availability of the PAC mechanism the law did not really “ban”
corporate spending as much as it required that spending be channeled
through a corporate PAC, so the Court need not “consider the validity of
a direct and absolute limitation on independent expenditures by
corporations.”113

104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
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Id. at 258.
Id. at 263–64.
Id.
MCFL, 479 U.S. at 248.
Id. at 263.
Id.
Id. at 264.
Id. at 266–72.
Id. at 271.
MCFL, 479 U.S. at 271 n.4.
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Four years later, in 1990, in Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of
Commerce, the Court applied MCFL’s logic and expressly upheld the
constitutionality of a state prohibition on the spending of corporate
treasury funds in candidate elections.114 In an opinion by Justice
Marshall for six justices, the Court agreed with Bellotti that restrictions
on corporate campaign spending are subject to the First Amendment, but
found that corporate spending presents distinct dangers that justify its
prohibition. Echoing MCFL and NRWC, Austin emphasized the statecreatedness of corporations, the state grant of “special advantages” to
corporations which give them the opportunity to amass great wealth,
and the lack of any necessary connection between the resources
corporations have for electoral activity and public support for their
political ideas. Austin couched this in terms of preventing corruption.115
Buckley had discussed corruption as the quid pro quo between a donor
and the candidate/elected official-recipient, but Austin held that such
“‘financial quid pro quo’ corruption” is not the only kind of corruption
Michigan’s law
that can justify campaign finance restrictions.116
addressed another type of corruption—“the corrosive and distorting
effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the
help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the
That
public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.”117
“antidistortion” argument sounds a lot like the egalitarian justification
for limiting spending that Buckley rejected, but Austin insisted that the
law addressed corruption, not political inequality.118 The problem with
corporate spending was not that corporations might spend more than
other political actors, that is, spending inequality, but distortion that a
corporation’s resources for campaign spending reflects its economic
success but has “little or no correlation to the public’s support for the
corporation’s political ideas.”119 Unequal spending was alright if it
reflected differences in the extent of support for different spenders’
political positions, but not when based solely on wealth differences.120
Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion emphasized the dissenting-

494 U.S. 652, 656 (1990).
Id. at 657.
116
Id. at 668.
117
Id. at 660.
118
Indeed, one of Justice Marshall’s law clerks, who clerked for him during the term in
which Austin was decided, characterized the Austin opinion as “hiding equality behind the
mask of corruption.” Elizabeth Garrett, New Voices in Politics: Justice Marshall’s
Jurisprudence on Law and Politics, 52 HOWARD L.J. 655, 669–78 (2009).
119
Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
120
Id. at 690.
114
115
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shareholder-protection justification.121 Noting that most members who
joined the Michigan Chamber of Commerce did so for economic and not
political reasons, he determined “the State surely has a compelling
interest in preventing a corporation it has chartered from exploiting
those who do not wish to contribute to the Chamber’s political
message.”122
Austin not only found anti-distortion to be a compelling justification,
but determined that the spending restriction was narrowly tailored to
accomplish that end.123 According to the Court, the restriction was not
an absolute ban on spending but merely a requirement that the
corporation use a PAC—which Michigan law, unlike the Massachusetts
restriction at issue in Bellotti, allowed.124 Moreover, where Bellotti had
imposed very tight “tailoring” requirements and was quick to fault the
Massachusetts law for over and under-inclusiveness, Austin was more
forgiving.125 The law’s application to closely-held corporations without
great reserves of capital was not a problem.126 As in NRWC, the Court
emphasized the need to defer to the legislative judgment that it is the
“potential for distortion” inherent in the capacity of the corporate form
to facilitate the accumulation of great wealth that justifies regulation.127
Nor was the law’s exclusion of unincorporated associations and unions
from the spending ban a constitutional difficulty.128 Unincorporated
groups might wield power and wealth but they did not benefit from the
“advantages unique to the corporate form.”129 Union campaign funds
were a more accurate reflection of employee support for union political
activities than a corporation’s general treasury funds because the law
gave employees the right not to have their union dues used for political
purposes if they objected.130
Taken together, NRWC, MCFL and Austin strongly validated the
special restrictions on corporations, notwithstanding Buckley and Bellotti.
Although the First Amendment applied, the dangers resulting from the
state-created advantages associated with the corporate form and the
Id. at 669–79.
Id. at 675.
123
Id. at 690.
124
Id. at 708.
125
Austin, 494 U.S. at 661.
126
Id. at 652–53.
127
Id. at 661.
128
Id. at 665.
129
Id.
130
See id. at 665–66 (identifying the characteristics of a union campaign fund); see also
Austin, 494 U.S. at 666–68 (justifying the law’s exemption of news and editorial
expenditures by the media’s “unique societal role” in promoting public education,
information, discussion, and debate).
121
122
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interest in protecting minority shareholders provided compelling
justifications for requiring corporations to channel their contributions
and spending through PACs. Bellotti was shunted aside as a ballot
propositions case of little relevance to candidate elections.
4.

Beaumont and McConnell

In 2003 in FEC v. Beaumont, the Court rejected an effort to create an
MCFL-type exemption from the corporate contribution ban for a
nonprofit corporation, North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. (“NCRL”), and
strongly affirmed the constitutionality of the corporate contribution
prohibition.131 Although NCRL’s resources, like MCFL’s, presumably
reflected the extent of public support for its ideological activities and not
its success in the economic marketplace—the Court was unwilling to
disturb “a congressional judgment that has remained essentially
unchanged throughout a century” that all corporate treasury fund
contributions should be excluded from federal elections.132 Citing
NRWC, MCFL, and Austin, Beaumont invoked “the ‘special characteristics
of the corporate structure’ that threaten the integrity of the political
process.”133 Beaumont found that “[i]n barring corporate earnings from
conversion into political ‘war chests,’” the corporate spending ban “was
and is intended to ‘preven[t] corruption or the appearance of
corruption”—the government interests that have been the basis for the
constitutionality of restrictions on contributions since Buckley.134
Beaumont credited the shareholder-protection rationale—“the ban has
always done further duty in protecting ‘the individuals who have paid
money into a corporation or union for purposes other than the support
of candidates from having that money used to support political
candidates to whom they may be opposed.’”135 Beaumont also gave great
weight to the value of the corporate contribution ban in preventing
evasion of the limits on individual contributions:
Quite aside from war-chest corruption and the interests
of contributors and owners, however, another reason for
regulating corporate electoral involvement has emerged
with restrictions on individual contributions . . . . To the
degree that a corporation could contribute to political
candidates, the individuals “who created it, who own it,
131
132
133
134
135

539 U.S. 146, 152 (2003).
Id. at 165 n.9.
Id. at 153 (quoting FEC v. NRWC, 459 U.S. 197, 209 (1982)).
Id. at 154 (quoting FEC v. NCPAC, 470 U.S. 480, 496–97 (1985)).
Id. (quoting NRWC, 459 U.S. at 208).
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or whom it employs,” . . . could exceed the bounds
imposed on their own contributions by diverting money
through
the
corporation . . . . [E]xperience
“demonstrates how candidates, donors, and parties test
the limits of the current law, and it shows beyond
serious doubt how contribution limits would be eroded
if inducement to circumvent them were enhanced.”136
Anti-circumvention, thus, joined prevention of corruption and
appearance of corruption, anti-distortion and dissenting-shareholderprotection as justifications for the ban on corporate contributions. The
anti-circumvention argument was given special prominence in
Beaumont’s justification of the application of the ban to a nonprofit like
NCRL.137 As the Court observed, “[n]onprofit advocacy corporations
are, moreover, no less susceptible than traditional business companies to
misuse as conduits for circumventing the contribution limits imposed on
individuals.”138
Beaumont also applied Buckley’s more deferential standard of review
for contribution restrictions to a law that banned—and did not merely
impose a dollar limit—on corporate donations. As the Court explained,
“[g]oing back to Buckley v. Valeo . . . restrictions on political contributions
have been treated as merely ‘marginal’ speech restrictions subject to
relatively complaisant review under the First Amendment, because
contributions lie closer to the edges than the core of political
expression.”139 As a result, whereas expenditure restrictions have to be
“narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest, ‘a
contribution limit involving “significant interference” with associational
rights’ passes muster if it satisfies the lesser demand of being ‘“closely
drawn’ to match a ‘sufficiently important interest.’”140 The question for
the Court was whether the ban was closely drawn to the interests
supporting the restriction on corporate contribution.141 At that point, the
Court, as in Austin, rejected the characterization of the prohibition of the
contribution of treasury funds as a “ban”:

136
Id. at 155 (citing FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 446–47,
456 & n.18 (2010); Austin v. Mich. St. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 664 (1990);
Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001)).
137
FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 160 (2003).
138
Id.
139
Id. at 161.
140
Id. at 162.
141
Id.
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NCRL is simply wrong in characterizing § 441b as a
complete ban. As we have said before, the section
“permits some participation of unions and corporations
in the federal electoral process by allowing them to
establish and pay the administrative expenses of
[PACs]. . . . The PAC option allows corporate political
participation without the temptation to use corporate
funds for political influence, quite possibly at odds with
the sentiments of some shareholders or members, and it
lets the Government regulate campaign activity through
registration and disclosure . . . without jeopardizing the
associational rights of advocacy organizations”
members.142
Beaumont noted that “a unanimous Court in National Right to Work did
not think the regulatory burdens on PACs, including restrictions on their
ability to solicit funds, rendered a PAC unconstitutional as an advocacy
corporation’s sole avenue for making political contributions.”143
Consequently limiting corporations to making contributions only
through their PACs did not unduly burden their speech and
associational rights.144
A few months after Beaumont, the Court in McConnell v. FEC upheld
BCRA’s extension of the federal prohibition on the use of corporate and
union treasury funds for independent expenditures to “electioneering
communications”—broadcast ads aired during a defined pre-election
period that refer to a candidate by name but do not use the “magic
words” of “express advocacy.”145 In so doing the Court recapitulated the
history of the special limits on corporations and unions—from Elihu
Root’s 1894 speech and Theodore Roosevelt’s 1905 Annual Message,
through the Tillman Act, the 1925 Federal Corrupt Practices Act, TaftHartley, Justice Frankfurter’s opinion in Auto Workers, and the enactment
of FECA—and then cited its more recent decisions as support for the
proposition that Buckley had done nothing to undermine the
longstanding special treatment of corporations and unions.146 “Since our
decision in Buckley, Congress’ powers to prohibit corporations and
unions from using funds in their treasuries to finance advertisements
expressly advocating the election or defeat of candidates in federal

142
143
144
145
146

Id. at 162–63.
Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 163.
Id. at 162–63.
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 168 (2003).
Id. at 115–22.
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elections has been firmly embedded in our law.”147 The Court reiterated
its position that the PAC option means it is “‘simply wrong’ to view the
provision as a ‘complete ban’ on expression rather than a regulation.”148
The “ability to form and administer” PACs “has provided corporations
and unions with a constitutionally sufficient opportunity to engage in
express advocacy.”149 Following hard upon the heels of Beaumont,
McConnell was the post-Buckley Court’s strongest endorsement of
legislative authority to restrict corporate campaign activity.150 But with a
five to four division and intense dissents, the ruling was a fragile one.
Indeed, McConnell quickly proved to be the high water mark for the
Court’s support for public power to regulate corporate campaign finance
activity. Following Justice O’Connor’s retirement and her replacement
by Justice Alito,151 the doctrinal wheel began to turn, and in 2010 in
Citizens United the new majority adopted a sharply different approach.152
III. CITIZENS UNITED
A. Corporate Campaign Expenditures
In Citizens United v. FEC, the Supreme Court struck down the TaftHartley and BCRA prohibitions on corporate and union independent
spending.153 In so doing, it overturned the relevant portions of both
McConnell and Austin, and sharply shifted the Court’s stance on such
basic issues as whether corporate campaign participation poses a special
threat to the political process, and the relevance of the PAC option to the
assessment of restrictions on corporate spending.154 Although the Court
Id. at 203.
Id. at 205.
149
Id. at 203.
150
Id.
151
Concurrently with Justice Alito’s replacement of Justice O’Connor, Chief Justice
Rehnquist died and was replaced by Chief Justice Roberts. However, given the similarity
of Roberts’s views to Rehnquist’s position in McConnell that did not affect the balance of
votes on the Court.
152
That shift actually being in 2007, in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469
(2007), in which the Court undid much of McConnell’s rejection of the constitutional
challenge to the portion of BCRA extending the ban on corporate and union expenditures
to electioneering communication. Chief Justice Roberts’s lead opinion determined that the
First Amendment permitted BCRA’s restrictions only for the narrow set of electioneering
communication ads that are “the functional equivalent” of express advocacy. In addition,
where McConnell has stressed that the BCRA provision was merely a requirement that a
corporation use its PAC to pay for its electioneering communication and was thus not
really a spending ban, Chief Justice Roberts insisted that the law was indeed a ban—a
“censorship” of political speech. Id. at 482.
153
558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010).
154
See id. (overruling Austin and McConnell).
147
148
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took pains to emphasize that it was addressing only a law limiting
expenditures, the case plainly has implications for the special restrictions
on corporate campaign contributions.
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the majority found that corporate
campaign expenditures, like other forms of political spending, are
protected by the First Amendment. Invoking Bellotti, he emphasized
that corporations, like individuals, can contribute to political discussion
and debate.155 He also stressed that the ban on the expenditure of
corporate treasury funds really is “a ban on corporate speech
notwithstanding the fact that a PAC created by a corporation can still
speak.”156 Breaking with Austin and McConnell he dismissed the
relevance of the PAC option because a “PAC is a separate association
from the corporation” and PACs are subject to “burdensome”
organizational, reporting, and record-keeping requirements.157 The
Court then applied strict judicial scrutiny to the corporate spending ban
and considered three possible justifications for it:
(1) Austin’s
“distortion” corruption; (2) the protection of dissenting shareholders;
and (3) prevention of quid pro quo corruption and its appearance.158
Justice Kennedy flatly rejected the idea that any electoral advantage
corporations might enjoy from their state-created advantages to amass
resources in the economic marketplace provides any basis for restricting
their campaign spending.159 He also dismissed the relevance of the
concern at the heart of Austin’s antidistortion rationale that corporate
political “funds ‘may have little or no correlation with the extent of
public support for a corporation’s political ideas.’”160 Citizens United also
found the dissenting-shareholder-protection argument could not sustain
the spending ban.161 Tracking Bellotti, the Court found the ban to be over
inclusive—it applied to “nonprofit corporations and for-profit
corporations with only single shareholders” where there could be no
dissenting votes—and under inclusive, applying only to certain forms of
corporate election spending and not others.162 Moreover, the Court
observed “[t]here is little evidence of abuse that cannot be corrected by
shareholders ‘through the procedures of corporate democracy.’”163
Finally, although recognizing that prevention of corruption and the
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163

Id. at 342–43.
Id. at 337.
Id. at 337–39.
Id. at 348–62.
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349–56.
Id. at 351.
Id. at 361-62.
Id. at 362.
Id. at 361–62 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978)).
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appearance of corruption are “sufficiently important” interests to justify
limits on contributions, the Court emphasized the point it had first made
in Buckley that those concerns could not support spending limits.164 The
Court stressed the longstanding doctrinal distinction between
contributions and expenditures when it dismissed the precedential
significance of NRWC. As Justice Kennedy acknowledged, “the Court in
NRWC did say there is a ‘sufficient’ governmental interest in ‘ensur[ing]
that substantial aggregations of wealth amassed’ by corporations would
not ‘be used to incur political debts from legislators who were aided by
the contributions,” but he went on to explain that “NRWC, however, has
little relevance here. . . . NRWC . . . involved contribution limits . . .
which, unlike limits on independent expenditures, have been an
accepted means to prevent quid pro quo corruption.”165
Citizens United rejected the longstanding anxiety in campaign finance
law about the power of corporate wealth to distort election outcomes
and public policy that provided a conceptual foundation for Austin and
McConnell. The survival of the corporate spending limits for nearly two
generations after Buckley is testimony to the continuing power of this
older idea in our campaign finance thinking. But Citizens United
demonstrates that the Roberts Court is more determined than ever to
limit the scope of campaign finance law and, especially, to reject equality
as a justification for regulation. Nonetheless, the Court’s continued
adherence to the contribution/expenditure distinction and to the
prevention of corruption and its appearance as justifications for
campaign finance regulation provide some basis for thinking that the
ban on corporate contributions may still be constitutional.
B. Citizens United and the Corporate Contribution Ban
As the Citizens United Court observed, Citizens United, the plaintiff,
has “not made direct contributions to candidates” and did not challenge
the federal corporate contribution ban.166 That constitutional challenge
has since been mounted but, with the prominent exception of one district
court decision soon overturned by an appellate panel.167 It has been
164
See id. at 356–61 (discussing government interests that are not important enough to
support limitations).
165
See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 358 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794); id. at 358–59.
166
Id. at 359.
167
United States v. Danielczyk, 788 F. Supp. 2d 472, 494 (E.D. Va. 2011), 791 F. Supp. 2d
513 (E.D. Va. 2011), rev’d 683 F.3d 611 (4th Cir. 2012). It appears that the federal district
court for the District of New Mexico, in an unreported opinion, also invalidated a corporate
contribution ban, in this case one adopted by the City of Albuquerque. Giant Cab Co. v.
Bailey, No. 1:13-cv-00426-MCA-ACT (D.N.M., filed May 6, 2103), discussed in Bob Bauer,
Breaking Bad in Albuquerque? Or: the Question of Corporate Contributions After Citizens
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repeatedly rejected; including by the Second, Fourth, Eighth and Ninth
Circuit Courts of Appeals.168
In so doing, these courts have relied on two points. First, Beaumont
remains the governing precedent.169 Citizens United “did not discuss
Beaumont and explicitly declined to address the constitutionality of the
ban on direct contributions.”170 Even if Citizens United’s rejection of the
anti-distortion and shareholder protection justifications for prohibiting
corporate treasury fund spending calls into question some of the
rationales invoked by the Beaumont Court, the rule articulated in Agostini
v. Felton requires lower courts to follow governing Supreme Court
precedent: “[i]f precedent of this Court has direct application in a case,
yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the
Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving
to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”171 Second,
as several of these courts emphasized, Citizens United not only formally
left Beaumont undisturbed, it also acknowledged the more deferential
standard of review traditionally applied to contribution restrictions since
Buckley v. Valeo, and did nothing to question the anti-corruption and
anti-circumvention arguments cited by Beaumont as important
governmental interests justifying the corporate contribution
prohibition.172 As a result, Beaumont is not only binding precedent but
also consistent with Citizens United’s analysis.173
United (Sept. 12, 2013), available at http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/2013/
09/breaking-bad-in-albuquerque-or-the-question-of-corporate-contributions-after-citizensunited/, archived at http://perma.cc/ZNA8-7EE7.
168
Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker, 717 F.3d 576, 601 (8th Cir. 2013); Minn.
Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 878–79 (8th Cir. 2012); United
States v. Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611, 615 (4th Cir. 2012); Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174,
183–84 (2d Cir. 2012); Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109, 1125 (9th Cir. 2011);
Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 189, 199 (2d Cir. 2010); accord United States v.
Suarez, 2014 WL 8579, at *1 (N.D. Ohio, May 8, 2014); see also Yamada v. Weaver, 872 F.
Supp. 2d 1023, 1063 (D. Haw. 2012) (relying on appeals court cases sustaining corporate
donation bans in upholding state law barring contributions to candidates for state office by
government contractors); Lavin v. Husted, 803 F. Supp. 2d 756, 763 (N.D. Ohio 2011)
(relying, in part, on Beaumont to reject a challenge to the constitutionality of an Ohio law
barring candidates for state office from accepting donations from Medicaid providers).
169
Garfield, 616 F.3d at 199 (finding that Citizens United did not overrule Beaumont).
170
Danielczyk, 683 F.3d at 617.
171
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (quoting Rodriguez de Quojas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)). Agostini was cited by the
Eighth Circuit in Tooker, 717 F.3d at 601 and Swanson, 692 F.3d at 879, and by the Fourth
Circuit in Danielczyk, 683 F.3d at 615.
172
See Danielczyk, 683 F.3d at 617–19 (noting that Beaumont is still good law, and that
restrictions on independent expenditures and contributions are subject to different
standards of judicial scrutiny); see also Ognibene, 671 F.3d at 195 (finding that Citizens United
confirmed the anti-corruption interest as being a legitimate justification for campaign
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Nonetheless, Beaumont drew heavily on the older strain in campaign
finance law, which treated corporations as an especially troublesome
threat to the “integrity of the political process.”174 As Beaumont put it,
the “special characteristics of the corporate structure” enable
corporations to convert their “earnings . . . into political ‘war chests’”
that pose a special danger of political corruption.175 Citizens United
completely disavowed this line of thinking. The state-enabled capitalamassers of earlier cases are now simply “associations of citizens”
engaged in constitutionally protected political activity.176 Targeting
corporations impoverishes the electoral debate by “prevent[ing] their
voices and viewpoints from reaching the public and advising voters on
which persons or entities are hostile to their interests.”177 Citizens United
emphasized that “[t]he First Amendment does not permit Congress to
make . . . categorical distinctions based on the corporate identity of the
speaker.”178 Even if the expenditure ban at issue in Citizens United is
distinguishable from the contribution prohibition upheld in Beaumont,
the Roberts Court’s “corporations-are-people-too” approach surely alters
the doctrinal climate for considering special restrictions on corporations.
As the Eighth Circuit observed, Beaumont’s precedential value rests
on “shaky ground.”179 Preserving the corporate contribution ban will
require a justification other than the concerns about corporate wealth
and power and the state-created advantages intrinsic to the corporate
form, which shaped the law in this area from the late nineteenth century
onward. Those arguments will focus primarily on Buckley’s principal
justifications for contribution limitations, the prevention of corruption
and the appearance of corruption, together with the Court’s repeated
determination, beginning with Buckley, that some restrictions may also
be justified as necessary to prevent circumvention or evasion of anticorruption measures.180 The interplay of anti-corruption and anticircumvention in the aftermath of Citizens United and McCutcheon will be
restrictions); Thalheimer, 645 F.3d at 1124–25 (finding that nothing in the explicit holdings or
broad reasoning of Citizen United invalidated the anti-circumvention interest in the context
of limitations on contributions); Garfield, 616 F.3d at 200 (finding that an anticorruption
interest has been recognized as a legitimate reason to restrict campaign contributions).
173
Accord Allen Dickerson, What Remains of Austin After Citizens United?, 44 U. TOL. L.
REV. 569, 574 (2013) (“Despite Austin’s fate, Beaumont continues to be good law.”).
174
See FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 125, 153 (2003).
175
Id. at 146–53.
176
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 354 (2010).
177
Id.
178
Id. at 364.
179
See Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 879 n.12 (8th Cir.
2012).
180
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 131–32 (1976).
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addressed in Part V. But it is also worth considering an argument that
has been central to the case for limits on corporations since the start of
the last century and was relied on in Beaumont but dismissed in Citizens
United—the protection of dissenting shareholders.181 To be sure, one
appeals court and one commentator have concluded that the
shareholder-protection interest is no longer available to justify the
corporate contribution ban, but that over-reads Citizens United.182
Expenditure limitations are subject to more searching judicial review
than contribution restrictions. Moreover, the “procedures of corporate
democracy” Citizens United invoked are unlikely to adequately protect
dissenting shareholder interests.183 Shareholder-protection should justify
the contribution ban, at least as to publicly held multi-shareholder
corporations.
IV. SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION AFTER CITIZENS UNITED
A. Shareholder Protection as a Sufficiently Important Interest
The shareholder-protection justification draws on multiple concerns.
First, corporate executives may use treasury funds to advance their own
interests, which may be adverse to those of shareholders. In 1905, the
Armstrong Committee accused New York mutual life insurance
companies of using policyholder funds to win legislative support for
measures limiting the ability of policyholders to sue managers for breach
of trust.184 More recently, one study that compared states with bans on
corporate independent spending before Citizens United with states that
permitted such spending found that states without limits on corporate
spending were far more likely to adopt corporate anti-takeover laws that
protected incumbent managers from hostile takeovers and thereby
decreased incentives for management to run their firms as efficiently as
181
Compare FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 154–55 (2003) (finding that shareholder
protection interest justifies corporate contribution ban), with Citizens United, 558 U.S. at
361–62 (finding that shareholder protection interest does not support corporate spending
ban).
182
See United States v. Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611, 618 n.3 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding Citizens
United rejected dissenting-shareholder interest as justification for the ban on independent
expenditures); Jason S. Campbell, Down the Rabbit Hole with Citizens United: Are Bans on
Corporate Direct Contributions Still Constitutional?, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 171, 198–99 (2011)
(contending that Citizens United rejects the shareholder protection interest in all contexts);
Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 197 (2d Cir. 2012) (determining that it was unnecessary to
address the question as a corporate contribution ban is justified by the anti-corruption and
anti-circumvention concerns).
183
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 362.
184
THE WEEKLY UNDERWRITER, PROVIDENT SAVINGS LIFE REINSURED BY THE POSTAL LIFE
OF NEW YORK 70 (1911).
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possible.185 Second, even if corporate spending is not actually opposed
to the interests of shareholders, it still may not be in the interest of the
firm. A growing academic literature has found that, with the exception
of firms dependent on government contracts or operating in heavily
regulated industries, corporate political spending does not result in
greater economic returns for the firm.186 Rather, there is some evidence
that firms that invest in political activity—again other than firms that are
government contractors or in heavily regulated fields—actually do
worse than other firms.187 According to some studies, firms that invest
in politics do not invest as much in research and development or
physical capital as other firms and they may be more likely to engage in
risky strategies.188 These studies suggest that corporate political activity
is also often associated with higher levels of senior executive
independence.
In effect, corporate election spending is less an
investment that increases shareholder wealth and more a “consumption
good” for senior managers seeking to advance their partisan
commitments, ideological beliefs, or personal careers. Providing some
support for this argument, Harvard Law School Professor John C. Coates
IV reports that a significant number of the CEOs and senior managers
whose firms engaged in above-average political activity went on to be
appointed or nominated to high level public office.189
See Timothy Werner & John J. Coleman, Citizens United, Independent Expenditures, and
Agency Costs: Reexamining the Political Economy of State Antitakeover Statutes, 31 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 127, 127 (2015) (finding a significant relationship between the presence of a corporate
independent expenditure ban and a state’s anti-take-over-laws).
186
See, e.g., Michael Hadani & Douglas Schuler, In Search of El Dorado: The Elusive
Financial Returns on Corporate Political Investments, 34 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 165, 166 (2013)
(finding that firms’ political investments are significantly and negatively related to market
valuation); John C. Coates IV, Corporate Politics, Governance, and Value Before and After
Citizens United, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 657, 664 (2012) (noting corporations engage in
a mix of shareholder-oriented and nonshareholder-oriented political activity, but the
predominant or average effect of political activity is negatively related to shareholder
interests); Rajesh K. Aggarwal et al., Corporate Political Donations: Investment or Agency? 14
BUS. & POL. 1, 1 (2012) (finding that after controlling for corporate governance, campaign
donations are associated with lower returns). But cf. Michael J. Cooper, Huseyn Gulen &
Alexi Ovtchinnikov, Corporate Political Contributions and Stock Returns, 65 J. FIN. 687, 687
(2010) (finding that of firms that have PACs that contributed to federal candidates, those
that gave to a greater number of candidates holding office in the same state that the firm is
based in enjoyed above normal increases in value).
187
See, e.g., Aggarwal et al., supra note 186, at 1; Coates, supra note 186, at 657; Hadani &
Schuler, supra note 186, at 165.
188
See Aggarwal et al., supra note 186, at 14 (finding that firms that donate more don’t
necessarily invest more).
189
See Coates, supra note 186, at 678–80 (reporting that of retired CEOs, over 11% were
appointed or nominated to political office between the time of their service as CEOs and
2011).
185
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The controversy following Target Corporation’s 2010 donation of
$150,000 to Minnesota Forward, a Section 527 committee jointly
organized by the Minnesota Chamber of Commerce and the Minnesota
Business Partnership to support pro-business candidates in Minnesota
state elections, indicates another way corporate spending can hurt a
company.190 Minnesota Forward used the funds provided by Target, the
well-known Minnesota-based retailer, and other corporations to pay for
independent spending in support of the Republican candidate for
governor, who opposed marriage equality for same-sex couples.191
Target had made a point of its “gay-friendly” policies, so that when its
donation became known the firm became the “target” of protests, a
highly publicized consumer boycott, and a media campaign, including
hostile YouTube videos by gay rights groups and the politically liberal
MoveOn.org.192 It is not clear if the boycott affected company sales or
stock price, but the company’s CEO quickly apologized to its employees,
saying that although the “intent” of its contribution had been to
“support economic growth and job creation” it recognized that its action
had “affected many of you in a way I had not anticipated.”193 Target also
said it would begin a “strategic review and analysis of our decisionmaking process for financial contributions in the public policy arena.”194
The Target episode and other instances of attempted consumer boycotts
aimed at companies that donate to controversial causes suggest the

190
Taren Kingser & Patrick Schmidt, Business in the Bulls-Eye? Target Corp. and the Limits
of Campaign Finance Disclosure, 11 ELECTION L.J. 21, 28 (2011); Brody Mullins & Anne
Zimmerman, Target Discovers Downside to Political Contributions, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 7, 2010),
available
at
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703988304575413650676561696, archived
at http://perma.cc/2TBN-VPTF; John Gibeaut, A Cautionary Tale of Corporate Political
Spending Emerges in Minnesota, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 22, 2010), http://www.abajournal.com/
news/article/a_cautionary_tale_target_corporate_political_spending_emerges_in_minneso
ta/, archived at http://perma.cc/5QW-F9M6.
191
Gibeaut, supra note 190.
192
Jennifer Martinez & Tom Hamburger, Target Feels Backlash from Shareholders, L.A.
TIMES (Aug. 19, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/aug/19/nation/la-na-targetshareholders-20100820, archived at http://perma.cc/2QQZ-MEYY.
193
See Kingser & Schmidt, supra note 190, at 29, 32–33. According to Kingser and
Schmidt, by August 18, 2010, or roughly three weeks after the bad publicity concerning
Target’s campaign activity had begun, the company had lost $1.3 billion in stock market
capitalization. Id. at 32–33. Although Target “questioned whether the boycott was the
cause for the decline in stock price arguing that there were ‘too many factors that we can’t
attribute it to just one thing.’” Id. at 30. In any event, “Target’s stock price [soon]
rebounded and August sales rose at a comparable rate to the year before.” Id. at 31.
194
Martinez & Hamburger, supra note 192.
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potential for reputational risk and resulting harm to investors when a
company’s political donations become known.195
Even if a corporation’s election spending may be in the interest of the
organization as a whole it may not be in the interest of all shareholders.
Corporate shareholders are presumably interested in using their
investment to increase their wealth. But shareholders—or, at least, the
individuals among them—are not just investors; they may also be
parents, employees, retirees, consumers, environmentalists, community
residents, and citizens with a host of interests and concerns that are
affected by electoral politics and that in turn affect their individual views
about elections. Their interests as parents or consumers or citizens may
differ from their interests as investors.
As investors, they might be better off with lower corporate taxes and
weaker environmental or consumer protection regulations. But as
citizens, consumers, or users of public services they may prefer higher
corporate taxes or more stringent rules. When it comes time to vote in an
election, each investor-consumer-parent-citizen has to balance out these
potentially conflicting preferences and values and make a decision, a
decision in which the non-investment interests could come out ahead.
As a shareholder, an individual might be better off if her firm supports
the anti-tax, anti-regulation candidate, but because of all her other
interests, that individual might vote for the candidate who favors raising
taxes to better fund public schools and addressing the emission of
greenhouse gases that contribute to climate change even if that hurts her
investment interest.
When corporate managers make campaign
contributions they do not take the shareholders’ non-investment
interests into account, nor is it easy to see how they could, given their
fiduciary duty to the corporation. In other words, a fundamental
problem with the use of corporate treasury funds in elections is not the
misuse of shareholder funds against shareholder economic interests but
See, e.g., CENTER FOR POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, TAKING INITIATIVE:
HOW
CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONS TO BALLOT MEASURES POSE A RISK TO SHAREHOLDERS, AND
WHY DIRECTORS MUST OVERSEE COMPANY POLITICAL SPENDING 38–54 (2008) (discussing
consumer boycotts aimed at companies that donated to controversial ballot proposition
campaigns); Michael Stocker & Matthew Moehlman, Are Shareholders Happy with Your
Company’s Political Spending, CORPORATE COUNSEL (Sept. 26, 2012), available at
http://knowledgenetwork.labaton.com/upload/2012_415-2.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/Z8D-ZJKW (finding that corporate political spending may also expose
companies to profit-impairing reputational risks); Rick Cohen, What to Do About
‘Reputational Risk’ to Nonprofits from Political Spending, NONPROFIT Q. (Mar. 23, 2012),
http://www.nonprofitquarterly.org/policysocial-context/20018-what-to-do-aboutreputational-risk-to-nonprofits-from-political-spending.html,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/UJK9-8PSM (indicating that political spending by 501(c)(4) organizations
might result in a serious reputational risk for all nonprofits).
195
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the overrepresentation of shareholders’ investment interest relative—and
in opposition to—their other interests.
In both of the Supreme Court’s cases dealing with restrictions on
corporate contributions, the Court found that shareholder protection
justified the federal corporate contribution ban. In NRWC, a unanimous
Court noted that one argument put forward for the prohibition of the
contribution of corporate treasury funds is to “protect the individuals
who have paid money into a corporation or union for purposes other
than the support of candidates from having that money used to support
political candidates to whom they may be opposed” and it “agree[d]
with the government” that this was a constitutionally sound
justification.196 Beaumont quoted the NRWC language and restated the
point.197
B. Narrowly Tailored
Citizens United did not directly address or reject the argument that
shareholder protection is a compelling interest—the standard in an
expenditure limit case—let alone a “sufficiently important” interest that
would justify a contribution restriction. Instead, the Court concluded
that the federal corporate spending ban was insufficiently narrowly
tailored because it was both under inclusive—it applied to “corporate
speech in only certain media within thirty or sixty days before an
election”—and “over[ ]inclusive because it covers all corporations,
including nonprofit corporations and for-profit corporations with only
single shareholders.”198 The federal corporate contribution ban is not
under inclusive as it applies to all donations to federal candidates,
national political party committees, and other political committees that
give to candidates. The over inclusiveness concern is more apposite.
Beaumont held that the federal corporate contribution ban applied to
nonprofit corporations without shareholders, but that was due to the
ban’s role in advancing the anti-corruption and anti-circumvention
concerns, not shareholder protection.199 If the only argument for barring
corporate contributions was shareholder protection, nonprofits and
single-shareholder corporations would have to be exempted. However,
the shareholder-protection argument could justify the ban with respect
to contributions by multi-shareholder, publicly-traded, for-profit
corporations. The Court in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. took a
similar approach in recognizing the distinction between publicly-traded
196
197
198
199

FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982).
FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 154 (2003).
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 362 (2010).
Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 163.
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and closely-held corporations and providing only the latter the
opportunity to assert religious objections to the application of the federal
mandate that employers provide their employees with health insurance
coverage for certain contraceptive methods.200 The “corporate giants”
that Hobby Lobby found would be unlikely to assert a religious objection
because of the wide range of religious beliefs among their “unrelated
shareholders—including institutional investors with their own set of
stakeholders” are precisely the corporations whose shareholders need
protection against the misuse of corporate funds for political purposes
they do not share.201 An MCFL-type exclusion for single shareholder,
closed corporations and for nonprofits would solve the over
inclusiveness problem for the shareholder-protection justification.
Citizens United hinted at an alternative reason the shareholderprotection interest failed to save the corporate spending ban. The Court
contended that shareholder protection could be effectively advanced
with less burden on First Amendment rights “‘through the procedures of
corporate democracy.’”202 Chief Justice Roberts made a similar point in
the Citizens United oral argument when he contended it is
“extraordinarily paternalistic for the government to take the position that
shareholders are too stupid to keep track of what their corporations are
doing and can’t sell their shares” if they object to corporate political
activity.203 But, in fact, it is extremely difficult for shareholders “to keep
track of what their corporations are doing,” or to use the “procedures of
shareholder democracy” to defend their interests.204
Corporations are under no legal obligation to disclose their election
spending to shareholders. To be sure, in recent years, many major
corporations have agreed to report to their shareholders about their
political activities, but these reports are often limited to a general
statement of corporate political spending policies or total amounts of
spending and do not necessarily include the amounts donated to or
spent independently for or against particular candidates.205 And the vast
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2776 (2014).
Id. at 2774.
202
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 362; see also Campbell, supra note 182, at 198–99 (contending
that Citizen United rejects shareholder protection interest).
203
Transcript of Oral Argument at 58, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (No. 08205).
204
See generally Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 362 (contending that “procedures of
shareholder democracy” will protect sharehold interests).
205
See CENTER FOR POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, THE 2013 CPA-ZICKLIN INDEX OF
CORPORATE POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND DISCLOSURE 24–34 (Sept. 24, 2013) (studying
the campaign spending practices of 195 of the top 200 companies in the Standard & Poor’s
500 index); see id. at 15 (finding only 46% of the companies surveyed “fully answered” for
which political entities, such as candidates, political parties, 527 groups, 501(c)(4)
200
201
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majority of corporations have no self-imposed reporting policies at all.
Election laws do generally require the disclosure of contributions and
expenditures, but these reports are made to public agencies, not to
shareholders; moreover, it is the recipients of the contributions, not the
donors, who are required to disclose, again making it difficult for
shareholders to keep track of what their corporations are up to.206
Even if a shareholder is informed about a particular corporation’s
campaign activity, there is little she can do about it. Voluntary corporate
disclosures are made in annual reports released long after the election in
which the contributions were made, and even election law disclosures—
though often reported before Election Day so as to inform the voters—
report contributions only after they have occurred. At that point the sale
of shares would be too late from the unhappy shareholder’s perspective
as the damage is already done. Further, any post-disclosure sale of
shares could require the shareholder to take a loss or trigger the
application of a capital gains tax. Either consequence would operate as a
monetary penalty discouraging sale. And, of course, many people do
not directly own shares in the corporation that engages in election
spending, but instead invest through mutual funds or pension plans.
Disinvesting would require selling the interest in the mutual fund,
thereby potentially disinvesting from dozens of other companies with
which the investor has no political quarrel; for many employment-based
pension plans it may not even be possible for the employee or retireeinvestor to change plans. As for “object[ing] in the corporate context,” it
organizations or trade associations “they would or would not give money”). In addition,
only 37% of the companies surveyed provided “detailed information on the public policy
priorities” that were the basis of their political decisions; another 22% of the companies
“provided more vague language on why they give.” Id.
206
Lucian Bebchuck & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Million-Comment-Letter Petition: The
Rulemaking Petition on Disclosure of Political Spending Attracts More Than 1,000,000 SEC
Comment Letters, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Sept. 4, 2014, 11:00 AM),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2014/09/04/the-million-comment-letter-petitionthe-rulemaking-petition-on-disclosure-of-political-spending-attracts-more-than-1000000sec-comment-letters/#printable, archived at http://perma.cc/QP4Y-SU5Y. In July 2011, a
committee of ten corporate and securities law professors filed a petition with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), urging the SEC to develop rules requiring public
companies to disclose their spending on politics. Id. In the following two years, the SEC
received more than 600,000 comment-letters on the petition—more than on any other
rulemaking proposal in the Commission’s history. Id. The Commission placed the
rulemaking petition on its regulatory agenda for 2013 but in late 2013, when the
Commission disclosed its regulatory agenda for 2014 the political spending rulemaking
petition was not on it. Id.; Dina ElBoghdady, SEC Drops Disclosure of Political Spending from
Its Priority List, WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
economy/sec-drops-disclosure-of-corporate-political-spending-from-its-priority-list/2013/
11/30/f2e92166-5a07-11e3-8304-caf30787c0a9_story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
S4UX-PEJV.
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is not clear what that means. General corporate law principles vest the
vast majority of corporate policy-making decisions in management.
Specifically, whether to make campaign contributions at all, and how
much and to whom to give are entirely up to management. Shareholders
have no legal say on these questions.
A recent Securities & Exchange Commission ruling—which applies
only to the public companies traded on the exchanges subject to its
jurisdictions—requires companies to place shareholder-initiated
resolutions concerning company political spending on the annual
meeting proxy statements for a shareholder vote.207 But under general
corporate law principles, such a shareholder resolution must be advisory
only and cannot bind the company.208 The closest the shareholders get to
having a voice is when they vote for the members of the board of
directors; although in only a little more than half of large public
companies do the boards of directors “regularly oversee” company
political spending.209 Of course, elections to the board of directors are
only rarely contested. Typically, the board itself nominates a slate,
which it places on the corporation’s proxy card, and the slate runs
unopposed. And even if there is an election contest, a shareholder
discontented with a company’s campaign contributions may still think
the incumbent board has generally done a good job in running the
company. As a result, the exercise of “voice,” like the exercise of “exit”
through sale, to protest corporate election spending is also
discouraged.210
Nor are there less restrictive alternatives to a complete ban that
would adequately protect dissenting shareholders. Employees required
to pay a fee to the union that represents them in collective bargaining are
entitled to “opt-out” of the union’s political spending to which they
object by obtaining a dues reduction proportionate to the share of the
union’s political spending.211 Professor Ben Sachs has proposed that
207
Shareholder Proposal Submitted by Home Depot to NorthStar Asset Management Funded
Pension Plan, SEC (Mar. 25, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cfnoaction/14a-8/2011/northstarasset032511-14a8.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/M7DYASER.
208
Shareholder
Resolutions,
FORUM
SUSTAINABLE
RESPONSIBLE
INVESTMENT,
http://www.ussif.org/resolutions (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/BX2B-RTU9.
209
Thomas W. Joo, Corporate Governance and the Constitutionality of Campaign Finance
Reform, 1 ELECTION L.J. 361, 367 (2002).
210
See id. at 368 (finding that shareholders are discouraged from selling shares by
prospect of negative economic effects).
211
See, e.g., Commc’n Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 745 (1987) (finding that
Congress did not intend to enable unions to force employees to fund political causes which
they oppose).
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shareholders be given a comparable opt-out right which would be
realized as an annual dividend equal to their pro rata share of the
company’s political expenditures.212 But as even Professor Sachs
acknowledges, “such a rule would be difficult to administer,” probably
fatally so.213 With many investors buying and selling stock on a frequent
if not daily basis, it will be extremely difficult to determine what any
stockholder’s pro rata share of corporate assets will be on an annual
basis. Many shareholders invest through mutual funds, which also buy
and sell shares throughout the year, making the shareholder’s stake in
any one company even more difficult to calculate.214 And as Professor
Sachs notes, “corporations do not have an obligation to pay dividends to
shareholders at any set time or based on any particular set of financial
circumstances” so that a political opt-out right “that took the form of a
mandatory dividend would be novel in U.S. law.”215
Other scholars have recognized that “[a]dministering an objection
system would be complex, particularly for shareholders whose stocks
are managed by a pension or mutual fund. Sending out rebate checks as
dividends . . . would not be a simple task.”216 The differences between
the very specific annual agency fee assessment imposed on employees
and the constantly fluctuating investment a shareholder has in a specific
corporation mean that opt-out is not a feasible or adequate alternative in
the corporate context.217
Alternatively, corporate contributions could be conditioned on a
shareholder vote. The United Kingdom requires that any company that
intends to spend more than £5000 on campaign activity must first obtain
the approval of its shareholders.218 The British law does not require
212
Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-out Rights After Citizens
United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 800, 864 (2012); see Jeremy G. Mallory, Still Other People’s
Money: Reconciling Citizens United with Abood and Beck, 47 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 36–37 (2010)
(explaining that dissenting union members are required to step forward, express their
objection, and claim a pro rata share of the funds used for advocacy).
213
Sachs, supra note 212, at 864.
214
See id. at 864 nn.314, 316 (finding that many investors hold their shares through
mutual funds).
215
Id. at 864 n.317.
216
Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Spending and Association Rights After
Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 98 CORNELL. L. REV. 1023, 1088 (2013).
217
See Sachs, supra note 212, at 858–62 (explaining the difficulty with the opt-out
proposal). Indeed, Professor Sachs appears to have proposed the shareholder opt-out
largely to underscore his view that the employee opt-out is burdensome for unions and to
make the case for “symmetrical” treatment for corporations and unions. See id. (arguing
that imposing an opt-out on unions but not corporations will favor the corporate view
point).
218
See MICHAEL SMYTH, PATRICIA BARRATT & FRASER CAMPBELL, THE LAW OF POLITICAL
DONATIONS 122–24 (2012) (summarizing the British law).
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shareholder approval of specific donations or expenditures but instead
provides general authority to use corporate funds for political purposes
and the total amount that may be spent until either the next annual
meeting of the shareholders or over the next four years.219 Given that
any shareholder vote would probably occur at the corporation’s annual
meeting, which will likely be held at a time unrelated to any elections
calendar, it seems inevitable that shareholder authorization would
address only the overall level or, perhaps, type of political expenditure–
contributions, independent expenditures, support for candidates, parties,
ballot propositions, political committees—but not the identities, or
amounts spent, with respect to specific beneficiaries or recipients.220 It is
also unclear what fraction of shareholders would be necessary to
approve a corporation’s electoral spending. Only a 100% rule would
fully protect the interests of all potentially dissenting shareholders, but
that would be tantamount to a ban.221
C. Shareholder Protection as Justification for a Contribution Ban
Citizens United has surely lain to rest for some time to come the
question of whether shareholder-protection can justify a ban on
corporate treasury fund spending, but that does not resolve the issue of
whether that interest can justify a contribution ban. The Court has
determined that contribution restrictions are less of a burden on First
Amendment interests and so are subject to a less rigorous degree of
scrutiny, merely that they be “‘closely drawn’ to match a ‘sufficiently
important interest.’”222 The Court has repeatedly recognized shareholder
protection as an important interest; Citizens United did not question that
219
Id.; see Ciara Torres-Spelliscy & Kathy Fogel, Shareholder-Authorized Corporate Political
Spending in the United Kingdom, 46 U.S.F.L. REV. 525, 526 (2011) (calling for adoption of the
British approach).
220
See Jennifer S. Taub, Money Managers in the Middle: Seeing and Sanctioning Political
Spending After Citizens United, 15 J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 443, 462 (2012) (pointing out that
most shares of large, publicly traded companies are held by institutional investors, such as
mutual funds and private pension plans, and most individuals who own stock do so
through such funds and plans). As a result, a shareholder approval requirement might
simply give decision-making authority to a small number of powerful money managers.
As Taub tartly put it, “[i]f the procedures of corporate democracy are lacking, the
procedures of mutual fund democracy are nearly non-existent.” Id. at 483.
221
See Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders’ Rights Under the First
Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 252–78 (1981) (arguing that it would be constitutional to
require a 100% shareholder support rule as a precondition for corporate political speech);
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124
HARV. L. REV. 83, 115 (2010) (finding that a rule requiring 100% approval would go too far
and be too demanding).
222
FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 162 (2003).
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and instead focused on the tailoring of the spending ban to the interest
and the availability of alternative, less burdensome means of vindicating
that interest.223 However, as McCutcheon observed, in the context of
contribution restrictions, what is required for a law to be “closely
drawn” is “a fit that is . . . reasonable; that represents not necessarily the
single best disposition but one whose scope is ‘in proportion to the
interest served,’ . . . that employs not necessarily the least restrictive
means but . . . a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired
objective.”224 The contribution ban is not under inclusive as was the
expenditure restriction in Citizens United; the over inclusiveness problem
can be addressed by an MCFL-type exception, and there is no less
restrictive means of protecting shareholder interests than a complete ban
on the contribution of corporate treasury funds. When coupled with the
mechanism in current law of allowing the corporation to maintain a PAC
which can make campaign contributions and to use corporate funds to
solicit voluntary donations to that PAC from shareholders, the burden of
the ban on the ability of people associated with a corporation to make a
contribution that reflects the fact of that association is greatly reduced.
The ban-plus-PAC option may not have been sufficiently narrowly
tailored to justify a ban on corporate spending, given the extremely high
value the Court has placed on spending aimed at the general public and
the strict scrutiny applied to restrictions on such spending. But given the
different standard of review for contribution restrictions, shareholder
protection for the shareholders of multi-shareholder for-profit
corporations is a sufficiently important interest, and the ban, with PAC
option, proportionately tailored to protect that interest to justify the ban.
V. CORRUPTION AND CIRCUMVENTION
From Buckley on, the Supreme Court has consistently held that
contributions may be restricted because of the important governmental
interests in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption. As
the Court explained, “[t]o the extent that large contributions are given to
secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders,
the integrity of our system of representative democracy is
undermined.”225 And the corruption danger justifying contribution
limits goes beyond “the giving and taking of bribes,” which are “only the
most blatant and specific attempts of those with money to influence
223
See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 475–79 (2010) (addressing shareholder
protection).
224
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1456–57 (2014) (quoting Bd. of Tr. of State Univ.
N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)).
225
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1976).
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governmental action.”226 Rather, as the Court subsequently observed,
the anti-corruption concern is “not confined to bribery of public officials,
but extend[s] to the broader threat from politicians too compliant with
the wishes of large contributors.”227 Buckley also found:
Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro
quo arrangements is the impact of the appearance of
corruption stemming from . . . opportunities for abuse
inherent in a regime of large individual financial
contributions. . . . Congress could legitimately conclude
that the avoidance of the appearance of improper
influence “is also critical . . . if confidence in the system
of representative government is not to be eroded to a
disastrous extent.”228
Although contribution restrictions burden the freedom of
association, Buckley found that even a “significant interference” with the
right of association may be “sustained if the [government] demonstrates
a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to
avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms.”229 The
prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption were held to
meet that standard.230 The Court has consistently adhered to this
position over the last four decades.231 Contribution restrictions have
occasionally been invalidated when the Court deemed them to be
unrelated to the prevention of corruption, such as limits on donations to
ballot measure committees, or limits on the total amount an individual
can give to all candidates and committees—or when the limits were so
low as to interfere with the ability of candidates, particularly challengers,
to compete effectively.232 Citizens United restated the difference in the
treatment of expenditure and contribution restrictions and Buckley’s
validation of “limits on direct contributions in order to ensure against
the reality [and] appearance of corruption.”233 Chief Justice Roberts’
opinion for the Court in McCutcheon noted that the parties and amici had
Id. at 28.
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000).
228
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27.
229
Id. at 25.
230
Id. at 33.
231
See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 93–94 (2003); FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 125,
146 (2003); Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. at 386; FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459
U.S. 197, 208 (1982).
232
Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 300 (1981);
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1438 (2014); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 249 (2006).
233
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010).
226
227
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spent “significant energy debating whether the line Buckley drew
between contributions and expenditures should remain the law,” but
determined there was “no need in this case to revisit Buckley’s distinction
between contributions and expenditures and the corollary distinction in
While hardly a ringing
the applicable standards of review.”234
reaffirmation of the traditional doctrine, the Chief Justice’s opinion
indicated that the anti-corruption justification Buckley relied on “may
properly be labeled ‘compelling,’” and so could be a basis for sustaining
contribution restrictions even if the Court were to impose the strict
scrutiny heretofore reserved for expenditure restrictions.235 Of course,
Buckley and the Court’s other cases relying on the anti-corruption interest
to sustain restrictions on individual contributions addressed dollar limits
on donations, not complete bans. To justify a complete ban on corporate
treasury fund donations requires turning to the closely related concern
with preventing evasion of the dollar limits on individual donations—
the anti-circumvention justification invoked by Beaumont when it upheld
the corporate donation ban—and it involves doing so in light of the
tighter review of closeness of fit embraced by McCutcheon.236
A. Anti-Circumvention
The Supreme Court first recognized an anti-circumvention
justification for restricting campaign finance activity in Buckley itself.237
In sustaining FECA’s $25,000 limit on the total contributions an
individual may give to federal candidates, parties, and political
committees in a calendar year, in addition to the dollar limit on how
much an individual may give to any particular candidate, the Court
found the aggregate limit justified by the concern “to prevent evasion of
the $1000 contribution limitation by a person who might otherwise
contribute massive amounts of money to a particular candidate through
the use of unearmarked contributions to political committees likely to
contribute to that candidate, or huge contributions to the candidate’s
political party.”238 It was “thus no more than a corollary of the basic
individual contribution limitation that we have found to be
constitutionally valid.”239 Although McCutcheon concluded that due to
subsequent changes in campaign finance law, FECA’s aggregate limit is
no longer needed to prevent circumvention of the limits on individual
234
235
236
237
238
239

McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1445.
Id.
Id. at 1434; Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 146; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140 (1976).
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 143.
Id. at 38.
Id.
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donations to candidates; it did not challenge circumvention-prevention
as a justification for laws intended to backstop contribution limits.240
Indeed, the Court has frequently turned to the prevention of the
evasion of the limits on direct donations to candidates as a justification
for other contribution restrictions. In California Medical Association v.
FEC, the Court sustained FECA’s limit on the amount of money an
unincorporated association can contribute to its own PAC.241 Although
there was no danger the association would “corrupt” its PAC, the
measure was needed “to prevent circumvention” of the individual- and
association-to-candidate donation limits previously upheld in Buckley.242
Similarly, in FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Commission
(Colorado Republican), the Court upheld the federal statutory limits on
expenditures by a political party that are coordinated with the party’s
candidate as a constitutionally valid means “to minimize circumvention
of contribution limits” on individual donations to candidates.243 The
majority opinion explained that “all Members of the Court agree that
circumvention is a valid theory of corruption.”244 As previously noted,
the prevention of circumvention was one of the justifications Beaumont
gave for upholding the federal corporate contribution ban, even when
applied to nonprofit corporations.245 And in McConnell v. FEC, the Court
repeatedly invoked the anti-circumvention justification in support of the
extension of the ban on soft money contributions to the national political
parties to the funding of the federal election activities of state political
parties; to solicitations by national, state, and local political parties of
donations by tax-exempt organizations; and to the funding of the public
communications of state and local officeholders concerning federal
candidates.246
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1444–47.
Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 200–01 (1981).
242
Id. at 197–98 (plurality opinion of Marshall, J.); see accord id. at 202–03 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (applying a more “rigorous standard of review” than the plurality but agreeing
that contributions to a PAC may be limited “as a means of preventing evasion of the
limitations on contributions to a candidate or his authorized campaign committee upheld
in Buckley”).
243
FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 465 (2001).
244
Id. at 456; see also id. at 456–57 n.18 (referring to “the long-recognized rationale of
combating circumvention of contribution limits designed to combat the corrupting
influence of large contributions to candidates from individual and nonparty groups, the
dissent does not take issue with his justification as a theoretical matter”).
245
FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155 (2003).
246
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 93 (2003); see id. at 165 (“Having been taught the hard
lesson of circumvention by the entire history of campaign finance regulation, Congress
knew that soft-money donors would react to [the ban on soft money donations to the
national political parties] by scrambling to find another way to purchase influence.”). Id. at
174; see id. at 176 (“Experience under the current law demonstrates that Congress’ concerns
240
241
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Although McCutcheon indicates that the Court will more closely
probe the fit between the seriousness of a circumvention problem and
the restriction intended to prevent it, there is nothing in the Court’s
recent campaign finance jurisprudence that suggests that prevention of
the circumvention of corruption-preventing and appearance-ofcorruption-preventing contribution limits is no longer a constitutionally
substantial interest capable of justifying a campaign finance restriction. 247
The possibility that individuals would use the ability of corporations to
make donations to evade the limits on individual donations is surely
substantial. It is extremely easy to create a corporation. In most states a
new corporation can be formed simply by filing a few papers and paying
a nominal fee. A single individual can generate multiple corporations
that he or she controls and can use to end-run the cap on donations. The
adoption of a dollar limit on the size of an individual’s donations to a
candidate would be meaningless if the individual could proliferate new
corporations, each of which could separately donate to the same
candidate.
Similarly, enabling corporations to participate in election campaigns
can lead to the frustration of disclosure requirements, as a donor can
easily disguise his role in a campaign by creating and putting money in a
corporation, which contributes to a candidate. Individuals may be able
to use their minor children to evade contribution limits but it is far easier
and quicker to generate multiple corporations, not to mention not having
to pay for their college educations. The use of corporations to evade
disclosure requirements became a regular occurrence after Citizens
United authorized corporate independent spending.248

about circumvention are not merely hypothetical.”); id. at 184 (citing “Congress’ strong
interest in preventing circumvention of otherwise valid contribution limits”).
247
In one of his early campaign finance opinions, Chief Justice Roberts signaled his
skepticism about the anti-circumvention argument when he condemned as “prophylaxisupon-prophylaxis” the effort to apply BCRA’s definition of “electioneering
communications”—an expansion of the definition of corporate and union independent
expenditures to cope with evasion of the statutory spending ban—to communications not
the functional equivalent of express advocacy. See FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551
U.S. 449, 479 (2007). The Chief Justice then quoted his own “prophylaxis-uponprophylaxis” phrase in McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1458 (2014), in rejecting the
prevention of circumvention of the individual contribution limits justification for the
aggregate contributions, implying that the contribution limit, in applying to all
contributions above a threshold amount, is itself a form of prophylaxis that prevents some
non-corrupt contributions in order to combat the use of contributions for quid pro quo
corruption.
248
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010) (holding that the government cannot
suppress corporate political speech and that corporations still have rights despite a profit
or non-profit status).
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In one notorious incident, an entity known as Specialty Group, Inc.,
which was first incorporated on September 26, 2012, contributed
$10,575,000 million to FreedomWorks for America, an independent
expenditure political committee, between October 1 and November 1,
2012.249 That made Specialty Group, Inc. the fourth largest donor to
independent spending groups in the 2012 election.250 FreedomWorks
itself was the sixth largest outside spender in 2012, and Specialty Group
accounted for more than half of its funds.251 However, according to
news accounts, “Specialty Group appeared to have no website
describing its products or services,” gave as its address a Knoxville,
Tennessee residence, and was not required to make any disclosure
concerning the source of its funds.252 Similarly, corporations and similar
artificial entities like limited liability companies (“LLCs”) can go out of
existence, change names, re-form, or work through subsidiaries or
affiliates in ways that at the very least hinder the ability of media, voters,
and campaign finance agencies to track the flow of funds from original
donor to ultimate campaign recipients.253 In Western Tradition Partnership
v. Attorney General (WTP) litigation, the post-Citizens United case in
which Montana unsuccessfully sought to sustain its century-old ban on
corporate campaign spending in state elections, the Montana Supreme
Court found that WTP—despite the word “partnership” in its name, the
entity is a corporation—was created “to act as a conduit of funds for
persons and entities including corporations who want to spend money
249
Jack Gilliam, Specialty Group Inc., Mystery Firm, Formed Days Before $5 Million Campaign
Gift, HUFF. POST (Oct. 27, 2012, 4:22 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/
10/27/specialty-group-inc-donation_n_2031207.html, archived at http://perma.cc/CL9GDZYA; Center for Responsive Politics, Specialty Group Inc.: Donor Detail, OPEN SECRETS,
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/donor_detail.php?cycle=2012&id=Special
ty+Group+Inc&type=O&super=N (last visited Nov. 15, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/7DMR-4QYZ.
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Center for Responsive Politics, 2012 Top Donors to Outside Spending Groups, OPEN
SECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&disp=D
&type=O (last visited Nov. 15, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/F9HY-RW7F.
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https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&chrt=V&type=S
(last visited Nov. 15, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/T3JN-8J5D.
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Jack Gillium, Groups Urge Probe of $12 Million Mystery Donation, AP (Dec. 20, 2012, 7:49
PM),
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/groups-12-million-mystery-donation-was-crime,
archived at http://perma.cc/MKR7-E6C2.
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archived at http://perma.cc/956Z-CQTM; see also Mike McIntire & Nicholas Confessore,
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anonymously to influence Montana elections.”254 Often little more than
“shadow money mailboxes,” these legal persons have become a key
mechanism for evading campaign finance laws.255 The ease with which
politically-active artificial entities can be proliferated, reorganized, and
dissolved makes the enforcement of constitutionally sound campaign
finance laws far more difficult. If these entities could make direct
contributions to candidates as well as engage in independent spending,
those difficulties would be further exacerbated. Corporations have
quickly come to play a large and growing role in enabling donors to
avoid disclosure.
As Ann Ravel, then-chair of California’s Fair Political Practices
Commission (“FPPC”) and now a member of the Federal Election
Commission, has observed, “people are willing to use circuitous routes
to avoid telling the voters who is behind campaigns.”256 Ravel made her
statement while announcing the imposition of a record $1 million civil
fine as part of the settlement of a case brought by the FPPC and the
California Attorney General against two nonprofit corporations that
together funneled more than $15 million into a campaign against two
ballot propositions—dealing with taxes and union political rights—on
the 2012 California ballot.257 The money, which ultimately derived from
a handful of super wealthy individuals, was channeled from the
originating donors to a group called Americans for Job Security, which
then transferred the money to the Center to Protect Patients’ Rights—the
ballot propositions had nothing to do with patients’ rights—and then on
to the Arizona-based Americans for Responsible Leadership and the
Iowa-based American Future Fund before the funds were finally sent on
to the Small Business Action Committee and the California Future Fund
for Free Markets for spending to oppose the ballot measures.258 It was,
as one news account put it, “a daisy chain of organizations” “that
operatives took to skirt disclosure obligations.”259

W. Tradition P’ship v. Attorney Gen., 271 P.3d 1, 4 (Mont. 2011).
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Similarly, Western Tradition Partnership touted to prospective
donors:
[W]e’re not required to report the name or the amount of
any contribution that we receive. So, if you decide to
support this program, no politician, no bureaucrat, and
no radical environmentalist will ever know you helped
make this program possible. . . . You can just sit back on
election night and see what a difference you have
made.260
It is not difficult to imagine corporations, if allowed to make campaign
contributions, playing a similar role in enabling individuals to evade the
limits on individual donations. The role of corporations in channeling
funds to SuperPACs engaged in independent spending could easily
provide a model for individuals seeking to enhance their ability to make
contributions to candidates beyond the statutory ceiling. An individual
who has “maxed out” on her permissible donation to a candidate could
then also create a corporation, fund that entity, and use that entity to
make another legally permissible maximum contribution. A recent
investigation of campaign practices in New York State, which permits
contributions by both corporations and LLCs, found that it is standard
practice for organizations to generate LLCs and subsidiaries to make
campaign contributions.261 The New York study found that one entity
had “utilized [twenty-five] separate LLCs and subsidiary entities to
make 147 separate political contributions totaling more than $3.1
million” over a four-year period.262
Alternatively, nonprofit corporations that engage in a mix of
electoral and other forms of political activity could be used as conduits
for additional contributions to candidates. To be sure, corporate
contributions to candidates would likely be smaller than the hundreds of
millions spent by SuperPACs if Congress responds to any invalidation of
the corporate spending ban with the enactment of a monetary limit on
corporate donations similar to those currently imposed on individual
and PAC donations.263 But permitting corporate contributions would
W. Tradition P’ship v. Attorney Gen., 271 P.3d. 1, 7 (Mont. 2011).
State of New York, The Commission to Investigate Public Corruption, Preliminary
Report, at 37 (Dec. 2, 2013), available at http://publiccorruption.moreland.ny.gov/sites/
default/files/moreland_report_final.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/57PS-4H39.
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still enable individuals to give more than the individual-to-candidate
limits that the courts have found to be valid.
The anti-circumvention argument has most purchase for singleshareholder, closely-held, and nonprofit corporations—precisely those
corporations for which the shareholder-protection argument is least
persuasive. These are the entities most likely to be dominated by a small
number of individuals who can use them to advance their personal
political concerns. With these organizations, the problem is not the
corporate “war chest” concern underlying Austin that Citizens United so
powerfully repudiated, but the ease with which they can be deployed to
circumvent the limits on individual donations to candidates. The anticircumvention concern also explains why an absolute ban, rather than a
dollar limit on corporate donations comparable to that on individual
donations, is needed. Assuming there are substantial, if not compelling,
public interests in preventing corruption and the appearance of
corruption that validate the statutory dollar limits on individual
donations, then every dollar above the statutory limit that is channeled
through a corporation triggers those interests.
B. Narrow Tailoring After McCutcheon
After McCutcheon, the main question for the corporate contribution
ban is whether it is sufficiently narrowly tailored to preventing the use of
the corporate form to circumvent the limits on individual donations, or
whether there are alternative, less burdensome means of achieving that
goal. In McCutcheon, the Court focused on three sets of factors in
determining whether a restriction is sufficiently narrowly tailored for it
to be justified by the anti-circumvention interest: (1) the existence of
other legal rules addressing circumvention; (2) the practical likelihood of
circumvention if the challenged restriction were eliminated; and (3) the
burden of the restriction on First Amendment rights in light of the
availability of other forms of campaign participation.264 In McCutcheon’s
aggregate limit context, the Court concluded there were multiple other
campaign finance laws that either already prevented or could be adopted
to prevent circumvention of contribution limits, such as limits on
donations by individuals to political committees, limits on donors
creating or controlling multiple affiliated political committees, limits on
donations to political committees that support or which the donor
anticipates will support a candidate the donor has directly supported,
elections/2014/01/05/9e7cfd9a-719b-11e3-9389-09ef9944065e_story.html,
http://perma.cc/N66M-FPEU.
264
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limits on committee-to-committee and candidate-to-committee transfers,
and strengthened rules on earmarking, that is, the practice of giving to a
political committee with an implicit understanding that the committee
will use the donation to aid a specific candidate.265 But these rules would
not preclude the use of the corporate form to evade individual-tocandidate contribution limits.
There are, of course, no federal laws that limit the number of
corporations an individual can create, the amount of money an
individual can invest in a for-profit corporation or donate to a nonprofit
corporation, or control the ability of directors, executives, shareholders,
or donors to a nonprofit to influence the election-related activities of a
corporation. Although a corporation could be subject to the restrictions
applicable to political committees, the Supreme Court has interpreted the
statutory definition of federal “political committee” to apply only to
organizations that have the “major purpose” of nominating or “election
of a candidate.”266 As a result, any business corporation, both large
public companies and closely-held companies like Hobby Lobby, or a
nonprofit that engages primarily in spending that falls outside the
definition of election-related activity, including political advertising that
does not consist of express advocacy or the functional equivalent of
express advocacy, would probably not be considered a “political
committee” and not be subject to the constraints that were crucial to
McCutcheon’s finding of alternative statutory or potential statutory
limitations on circumvention.
The earmarking restrictions would do little good in limiting the
ability of donors—who are also dominant voices in the corporations on
whose boards they sit, manage, or own shares—to direct corporate funds
to candidates. Those who control a corporation need not make any
“contribution” to the corporation as a predicate to directing the
corporation to making a contribution to candidates to whom they have
already given the maximum contribution. Nor would they need to
formally earmark any contribution they do make if they also control the
decisions of the corporations that receive the funds. As the Court
previously observed in Colorado Republican, relying on the antiearmarking rule “ignores the practical difficulty of identifying and
directly combating circumvention under actual political conditions.”267
Id. at 1446–47, 1458–59.
See 52 U.S.C. § 30101(4)(A) (2014) (defining a “political committee” as a “committee,
club, association or other group of persons” that receives campaign contributions or makes
campaign expenditures above the statutory $1000 threshold). The Act then defines
“person” to “include[] an individual, partnership, committee, association, [or]
corporation.” Id. § 30101(11); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1976).
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Similarly, although rules could be framed that attempt to subject all
related entities to a single contribution ceiling, such rules would likely be
extremely difficult to administer. Corporations can be structured to
avoid formal affiliations or to have complex ownership relationships, so
determining whether and how two or more firms are connected can be a
difficult task for enforcement agencies.
In McCutcheon, the Court focused on the practical unlikelihood that
donors who have maxed out on their donations to the candidates they
support would take advantage of the elimination of aggregate
contribution limits by channeling additional contributions to those
candidates through contributions to political party committees or the
committees of other candidates. According to the Court, “all indications
are that many types of recipients have scant interest in re-gifting
donations they receive.”268 More specifically, “state parties rarely
contribute to candidates in other States,” and “candidates contribute
only a small fraction of their campaign funds to other candidates.”269 As
the Court explained, both political parties and candidates have their own
distinct electoral interests, which may not include donating to specific
candidates favored by certain donors. But the political interests of the
many small corporations controlled by their principal shareholders or
nonprofits controlled by their executives or boards are likely to be
exactly the same as those of their shareholders, executives, and boards.
These firms may be entities legally distinct from their shareholders,
managers, and directors, but when it comes to politics, like the religious
beliefs at issue in Hobby Lobby, their electoral goals may be precisely the
same as those of their shareholders and others that control them. In
other words, they are less intermediaries like political parties and more
alter egos for their shareholders and controlling individuals who in
practice will be quite capable of using the corporate form for
circumvention of the individual donation limits.
As for the magnitude of the burden on First Amendment rights in
light of the availability of other forms of campaign participation,
McCutcheon emphasized that the aggregate donation limit prevented
donors from giving the non-corrupting base limit amount to as many
candidates as they wanted, and that other means of providing support,
such as personally volunteering for those candidates, were not “a
realistic alternative for those who wish to support a wide variety of

McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1457.
See id. at 1455–56 (“The Government provides no reason to believe that many state
parties would willingly participate in a scheme to funnel money to another State’s
candidates.”); id. at 1457.
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269
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candidates or causes.”270 The corporate contribution ban is a much less
burdensome restriction on the rights of the individuals affiliated with a
corporation.
After McCutcheon, those individuals have the right to contribute the
base amount to as many candidates as they desire. The corporate
contribution ban simply limits their ability to give more than the base
amount to a candidate. The ban does restrict the ability of individuals
associated with a corporation to give as a group by having the
contribution given by the corporation, but other means of providing
support from the corporation are available.
Given Citizens United, the corporation can engage in unlimited
independent spending. Although not a perfect substitute for a donation,
McCutcheon noted that “from the donor’s point of view” this is still a
valuable alternative.271 Such independent spending also provides
information to voters and the public about the corporation’s views about
the election. And, of course, the law provides an alternative mechanism
for individuals associated with the corporation to support candidates in
the name of the corporation—the PAC.
The corporation can establish a PAC, select its managers, spend
corporate funds soliciting donations from individuals affiliated with the
corporation, and exercise total authority over which candidates the PAC
will support and how much, up to the statutory ceiling, those candidates
will receive.
Although Citizens United rejected the idea that a
corporation’s ability to create a PAC and direct the spending of PAC
funds solved the First Amendment problem posed by the banning of
corporate independent spending, the PAC is a more adequate alternative
in the contribution context.272
The Court has repeatedly held that there can be no limit to
independent spending. Limiting a corporation’s spending to its PAC
funds, when the size of individual donations to the PAC are subject to a
statutory ceiling, means the corporation will have less money to spend
on elections than if it could also draw on its treasury funds.273 But
assuming that corporate donations to individual candidates would be
subject to a dollar cap, the requirement that the PAC draw its funds from
voluntary donations from persons affiliated with the corporation is
much less of a restriction on the ability of a corporation to contribute to a
candidate. Moreover, as previously noted, the PAC device also protects
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dissenting shareholders from having their share of corporate resources
given to candidates they do not support.274
The combination of unlimited corporate independent spending and
the availability of the corporate PAC device for contributions mitigates
the burden on freedom of association posed by the corporate
contribution ban. Individuals associated with a corporation can still
participate in campaign financing under the name of the corporation
through its PAC, and the corporation as a distinct entity can still support
candidates through the independent spending of treasury funds. The
relatively modest burden on associational rights resulting from the
corporate treasury fund contribution bans is surely not more than the
“‘significant interference’ with protected right of political association”
that the Court has repeatedly indicated it is willing to allow to prevent
evasion of the important public interests in preventing corruption and its
appearance that support limits on individual contributions to
candidates.275
VI. CONCLUSION
The corporate contribution ban is closely drawn to accomplish two
substantial public interests: (1) the protection of dissenting shareholders;
and (2) the prevention of the circumvention of the limits on individual
contributions to candidates, which vindicate the public’s interests in
The
preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption.276
Supreme Court has repeatedly held these are important public interests;
indeed, McCutcheon indicates that the anti-corruption interest is
The two interests work in tandem, with the
“compelling.”277
shareholder-protection interest most salient for publicly held for-profit
corporations, and anti-circumvention more applicable for closely-held
and for nonprofit corporations. Both interests together support a
complete ban, rather than a dollar limit, on corporate contributions as
any corporate donations raise the prospect of the political use of money
inconsistent with shareholder preferences or the evasion of the statutory
caps on individual donations to candidates. And, as McCutcheon

274
Citizens United also expressed concern about the recordkeeping and reporting
requirements FECA imposes on PACs. Id. But these are comparable to the rules imposed
on all political committees engaged in federal electoral activity. If corporations were able
to make campaign contributions they likely would be subject to reporting and disclosure
requirements, which have been consistently held constitutional.
275
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1444 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976)).
276
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 372.
277
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1445.
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requires, the ban is proportionate to these interests.278 There are no
effective alternative mechanisms for vindicating these interests than the
ban. Given management’s complete control over the decision whether to
make campaign contributions, the “procedures of corporate democracy”
are inadequate to protect dissenting shareholder interests.279 So, too,
given the ease with which individuals have already used the corporate
form to evade the disclosure of donors to entities that engage in
independent spending, it is evident that the corporate form could easily
be used to circumvent the individual contribution limits. And the
corporate contribution ban still permits many forms of corporate
participation in elections, including unlimited independent spending,
and contributions by PACs created, financed, and controlled by their
parent corporations.
Of course, this analysis depends on the Court’s continuing
adherence to the contribution/expenditure distinction with its less
stringent review of contribution restrictions.
Buckley held that
contributions are a less protected form of campaign finance activity than
expenditures because a contribution:
[S]erves as a general expression of support for the
candidate and his views, but does not communicate the
underlying
basis
for
the
support. . . . While
contributions may result in political expression if spent
by a candidate or an association to present views to the
voters, the transformation of contributions into political
debate involves speech by someone other than a
contributor.280
As a result, the Court has not applied strict scrutiny to contribution
restrictions; but has found that contribution controls can be justified by
interests that are “weighty” even if not “compelling;” and have required
restrictions to be “closely drawn” but “not necessarily the least
restrictive means” to achieve the public interest the restriction is
intended to vindicate.281 However, the Court has recently hinted that the
more relaxed standard of review of contribution restrictions may be up
for reconsideration.
In McCutcheon, Chief Justice Roberts noted that the parties and amici
had spent “significant energy” on the question “whether the line Buckley
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drew between contributions and expenditures should remain law.”282
The Court declined to reach the question or “parse the difference
between the two standards” because it found that there was so
“substantial” a “mismatch” between the aggregate limit at issue in that
case and the anti-corruption and anti-circumvention goals said to justify
it that the limit flunked even Buckley’s less restrictive “closely drawn”
test.283 In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas called for applying
strict scrutiny to contribution restrictions, a position he has frequently
taken before, occasionally joined by Justice Scalia.284 Justice Kennedy has
also indicated some restiveness with the contribution/expenditure
distinction.285 A few months after McCutcheon was handed down, in
McCullen v. Coakley, the Court confirmed that McCutcheon had
“assume[d], without deciding” whether Buckley’s “less stringent level of
scrutiny applies,” implying that the Court is not necessarily still
committed to Buckley’s approach.286 Moreover, McCutcheon plainly
ratcheted up the “closely drawn” test as it invalidated a contribution
restriction Buckley had previously upheld, the first time the Court has
overruled any part of Buckley.287 I have indicated that the corporate
contribution ban can survive even McCutcheon’s tighter approach to
narrow tailoring.
But if McCutcheon is signaling the Court’s
abandonment of Buckley’s “relatively complaisant review” of
contributions then the contribution ban will be difficult, if not
impossible, to sustain.288
Citizens United rejected the shareholder-protection justification for an
expenditure ban.289 If contribution restrictions are to receive the same
treatment as expenditure regulations, then it would be unlikely
shareholder protection could validate a contribution ban. And if
contribution restrictions start to fall because they are insufficiently
narrowly tailored to advance the anti-corruption interest, as Justice
Thomas has contended, then the anti-circumvention justification would
disappear because there would be no individual contribution restrictions
to circumvent.290 In the end, then, the fate of the corporate contribution
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ban is likely to turn on the constitutional status of contribution limits
generally rather than a particular jurisprudence of corporate campaign
finance activity.
There is, of course, a reasonable question as to whether the corporate
contribution ban, or any contribution restrictions for that matter, makes
much sense given Citizens United and McCutcheon. In light of the ability
of corporations, individuals, and a host of other campaign actors to
spend as much as they want on communications aimed at the voters, and
of wealthy individuals to give to an unlimited number of candidates,
political party committees, and other political committees that support or
oppose candidates, it is unclear exactly what contribution limits do to
stem the influence of big spenders and donors on elections and on the
governmental decisions of elected officials. Even under the Court’s
relatively narrow focus on the corruption of individual officeholders
rather than on the impact of campaign money on the political system
more broadly, it is undeniable that big independent spenders and megadonors are able to use their campaign money to obtain greater political
influence, even without the quid pro quos that the Court has made the
focus of the corruption concern. So, why even bother attempting to
defend the corporate contribution restriction?
There are two answers to that. First, there may be some merit to the
Court’s position that money given directly to a candidate is likely to be
more valuable to the candidate and, as a result, a source of greater
influence for the donor than an equivalent amount of money spent
independently in support of that candidate. Unlike independent
spending, the candidate has complete control over the use of the
donation, including whether it should be used for ads, and if so, the
content of and audience for the ads. Independent spending can
sometimes strike the wrong notes or distract from the candidate’s
messages. Although there are modes of informal cooperation between
spender and candidate that can allay this problem, it is surely the case
that a candidate would prefer to have total control over his or her
campaign’s money.
Moreover, even when the candidate’s and the independent
committee’s messages are in complete accord, candidate broadcast
advertising benefits from the requirement that candidates can be
charged only the lowest unit rate while independent committees may
have to pay more for the same volume of advertising in the same
markets. As a result, a dollar of candidate broadcast ad spending can go
further than the independent spending dollar. To be sure, the ability of
independent groups to engage in unlimited spending can offset some of
the disadvantages of unlimited spending relative to contributions to a
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candidate, but dollar-for-dollar a candidate is likely to prefer, and feel
more gratitude for, a contribution than an expenditure, so there may still
be some anti-corruption benefit in limiting contributions even when
there are no limits on spending.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, this Article is concerned
with the constitutionality of corporate contribution limits, not their
wisdom. The question of whether the federal government, a state, or a
locality decides to bar corporate contributions should be up to the
elected representatives of the jurisdiction (or the voters in a jurisdiction
with the voter initiative), not the courts. Campaign finance regulation
involves highly contested issues of both political philosophy and the
empirical assessment of the impact of money on elections and
governance. The Constitution provides no clear answers to these
questions and it is far from obvious that unelected federal judges with
little experience in electoral politics are better at resolving these
questions than democratically accountable representatives or the voters
themselves. Nonetheless, for close to forty years the Supreme Court has
assumed a leading role in setting campaign finance policy and restricting
the regulatory options available to the public. In so doing, the Court has
followed a complex and inconsistent path, relying on difficult
distinctions, and changing its position on such basic questions as the
justifications for regulation and the deference due to elected decisionmakers or the voters. In the past decade the Court has greatly tightened
its control, with a narrow majority striking down multiple federal and
state laws in decisions such as Citizens United and McCutcheon that have
entailed overturning the Court’s own precedents.
Given the lack of a clear constitutional mandate for the Court’s
campaign finance jurisprudence, the difficulty the Court has experienced
in developing workable doctrines or sticking with the rules it has
articulated, and the general absence of obvious right answers for
campaign finance law it would be desirable to leave some discretion to
democratically accountable decision-makers.
There is certainly a
“laboratories of democracy” justification for such an approach—with
some states barring corporate contributions and some allowing them, we
can get a better understanding of their impact on elections, governance,
and the interests of corporations, than if the bar is pronounced
unconstitutional. And then there is the plain-old democracy justification
for not striking down laws that have enjoyed public support for more
than a century, have had no apparent deleterious impact on the political
process, have not discriminated against any individuals or ideas, and
have long been accepted as consistent with prevailing constitutional
doctrine. Barring corporate contributions may or may not make sense in

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 2 [2015], Art. 8

452

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

light of the constitutional protection for unlimited spending, but that
judgment should be entrusted to the democratic process, not the courts.
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